Evaluates U.S. Government response to the 1991/1992 drought in Malawi. Despite problems with timeliness, beneficiary targeting, and less than optimal participation by the Government of Malawi (GOM), the relief program accomplished its primary objectives of preventing starvation and migration and enabling successful agricultural recovery. This success was possible because of the responsiveness and flexibility of the international aid community and a high degree of regional and local coordination. The early availability of U.S. grain enabled relief distributions to begin almost immediately after the disaster was declared and to continue almost until other donor maize arrived. In April 1992, at USAID’s urging, the GOM began distributing, in the most affected areas, 20,000 MTs of U.S. Title II food that had been left in Malawi after a previous relief effort. In addition, at the request of the U.S. Ambassador, 45,000 MTs of maize which A.I.D/W had pre-positioned in South Africa after the first indications of a serious regional crisis was allocated to Malawi and began arriving June 5, 5 months prior to the arrival of Malawi-specific relief maize. Finally, 44,700 MTs of U.S. maize was borrowed from the Mozambican refugee program and distributed in July and August 1992. These three sources provided nearly 110,000 of the 190,000 MTs of total U.S. maize contributions, which themselves accounted for about two-thirds all the relief food provided to Malawi. After the emergency, the flexibility to deprogram food pledged to Malawi but no longer needed led to considerable savings in effort and funding. Despite its success, the relief program suffered from the disappointing and inappropriate response of the GOM, which acknowledged the crisis only after strong and persistent donor pressure, was reluctant to distribute its Strategic Grain Reserve or even to assign counterparts (believing all material and financial aid should come from donors), and insisted absolutely on retaining control over food allocation and distribution decisions in order to reap political benefit from the free distribution of donor food. The following lessons were learned. (1) The degree of control maintained by donors in allocating resources and managing relief efforts should be based on a government’s capabilities, legitimacy, and accountability to its citizens. The less capable or legitimate a government, the less it should be permitted authority over the programming of donated emergency commodities. (2) Where feasible, a disaster response program should use existing food distribution systems; such an approach is likely to be more cost-effective and logistically efficient than setting up a parallel distribution system. If donors decide not to support monetization of emergency commodities in order to avoid a co-opting of the process by the host government for political gain, then donors must maintain a high degree of control over resource input levels and in-country distribution. (3) International disaster responses should use a lead agency approach to channel and pool resources and facilitate a unified response. At the same time, bilateral donors who contribute significant resources have an obligation to actively participate in decisions as to how those resources are used. (4) Development programming should seek to reduce a country’s vulnerability to frequently recurring disasters. Likewise, initial planning for relief programs should include planning for the recovery phase, e.g., distributing agricultural seed packs. (5) The levels of responsibility and accountability among the host government, World Food Programme, and NGOs need to be defined at an advanced stage of an emergency and clear policy guidelines agreed upon by all as soon as possible. (6) Where extraordinary imports of relief aid are contemplated, a logistics appraisal should be undertaken as part of the overall needs assessment; this appraisal should make recommendations on required financial and personnel resources, suggest strategies, and estimate costs.
