A.I.D. and other donors mounted a massive emergency effort to feed the 1.5 million Chadians affected by the 1984-85 drought. Despite its shortcomings, the program was a success, according to this evaluation. Based on secondary sources review and interviews and observations in Washington, D.C. and in the field, the evaluation presents detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations in five key areas — timing, management, impact, health and nutrition, and transition to development. Timing. Due to a lack of early warning, emergency preparedness, and contingency plans, available amounts of emergency food were insufficient in late 1984 and early 1985, diluting program effectiveness. Chad’s weak transportation and logistical systems — compounded by political problems — proved major obstacles. Management. The management strategy of using the World Food Programme (WFP) and PVO’s, supported by a network of action committees under the Government of Chad (GOC), as the main implementing agencies proved very successful. Fuller and earlier delegation by AID/W to USAID/C of contracting responsibility would have helped avoid delays. Impact. Although insufficient in late 1984 and early 1985, emergency food assistance was targeted successfully and saved many lives, especially among the needy who received food in targeted programs of the WFP and PVO’s rather than through general distribution. Resettlement programs successfully limited the creation of spontaneous camps; some of those resettled were taught productive agricultural techniques. Health and nutrition. The GOC depended heavily on donors and PVO’s to define the health and nutritional impacts of the famine. PVO’s in particular did an excellent job of identifying geographical areas for emergency food distribution. However, lack of infrastructure greatly inhibited health efforts. Vitamin A deficiency was neither assessed nor treated, nor was oral rehydration therapy used extensively. Transition to development. The shift from emergency relief to development was facilitated by mechanisms such as food for work and resettlement. The transition needs, however, to account for persons still at risk and to develop a strategy in case the drought recurs in 1986. Included are 10 general recommendations for future emergency food distribution programs.
