Final report of Development Associates (DA) on phase II of the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) (1995-9/03), which supported CAMPFIRE, a Zimbabwe-based program designed to use NRM to develop economically sustainable communities on lands marginally suitable for agriculture. DA carried out its contractual responsibilities in accordance with the contract. It executed, managed, and administered 79 grants to the CAMPFIRE Association (CA), its rural district council (RDC) members, and selected CAMPFIRE service providers (CSPs). DA delivered the TA and training services called for in its contract and this contributed to the improved management of USAID funds, a strengthened leadership role for CA, and improved grant management by CA and many of its RDC partners. The CSPs used their grants to conduct the research/studies and to perform most of the TA and training services envisioned. DA met and frequently exceeded the quantifiable contract targets (numbers of pre-award surveys conducted, NGO grants awarded, etc.) and took on a much greater training and TA role than originally anticipated. DA also constructed the CAMPFIRE office facility (an activity not included in its contract), and performed much more “stewardship” services for grantees than anticipated. DA progressively became more involved in the technical aspects of NRM and in Campfire Development Fund (CDF) project design and implementation as these needs became apparent. DA added a program manager to its staff to better service the rapidly expanding requirements of the CDF. This position continued throughout the contract and was an important catalyst for CDF implementation. DA added engineering functions to the position as the CDF became more deeply involved in construction activities. In its Secretariat role, DA maintained productive and close working relationships with USAID, the CA, and numerous CAMPFIRE implementing partners. This was especially important in dealing with very difficult institutional issues involving CA, sensitivities regarding host government participation in a NGO-driven program, and the economic, social, and related hardships experienced in Zimbabwe over the last few years. Despite management and institutional setbacks, CA developed as an institution and assumed its CAMPFIRE leadership role. Several lessons were learned. (1) During implementation, DA played the often incompatible roles of paymaster and in-house training and TA provider for CA, making it less likely that CA would accept DA”s advice and training services. DA”s powerful role in managing the CDF was a further complication. (2) There were also tensions between DA and CA. CA thought it should manage the grantmaking process alone, while DA had contractual responsibilities to make grants, disburse and account for funds, and monitor implementation. (3) During the project, in-country conditions deteriorated dramatically — and unforeseeably — to the extent that simple implementation actions became major logistical problems due to rampant inflation, currency devaluation, material scarcities, and the breakdown of many rural institutions. (4) The introduction of the small grant window was beneficial to the program. In hindsight, it would have been advantageous to have increased the emphasis on small projects, and lessen the importance placed on developing larger projects. Large projects (pursued by most RDCs) tended to bog down over time and there was no incentive scheme to reward active RDCs (and communities) for timely project completion. On the other hand, timely completion of smaller projects enabled the RDCs to apply immediately for another project. (5) Over the course of the project, the role of the RDCs became increasingly politicized, playing havoc with the implementation of projects; there was little progress during much of 2002/03. (6) CA”s role as overseer/coordinator of NRMP implementation frequently clashed with its other responsibilities such as representing the RDCs and levying them for funds needed to defray CA operating costs. It was difficult for CA to crack the whip on RDCs for poor CDF project performance while being very dependent on them for funding. (7) The failures of some RDCs to consult with communities during project planning often delayed implementation and caused resentment by the communities. (8) Projects were often totally reliant on RDC performance. In some cases communities lost out on feasible projects because their council was not performing adequately. . CAMPFIRE now reaches 53 of the 57 rural districts in Zimbabwe, an increase from 24 in 1995. While only about 30% of CA”s membership earns significant revenue derived from robust wildlife endowments, many other RDCs now generate modest CAMPFIRE income from non-traditional resources such as eco-tourism, timber, indigenous plant products and commercial fishing. The CDF funded 74 grant projects for a total USAID contribution of approximately $3.5 million. The first phase funded 24 institutional capacity building grants (ICBs) designed to strengthen the RDCs” capability to support and promote CAMPFIRE activities, organize community-based institutions, and train communities to properly manage their natural resources. The second phase of the CDF funded 48 infrastructure grants in support of community-based NRM and related income generation initiatives. These projects focused on such areas as eco-tourism, crafts, beekeeping, commercial fishing and veldt fire management. Projects also featured new mechanisms to enhance devolution and private sector involvement.
