Summarizes attached evaluation of project to strengthen and institutionalize the monitoring and evaluation functions of the Royal Thai Government”s (RTG) National Rural Development Program. Evaluation covered the period 6/84-2/87 and was based on document review, site visits, and interviews with project, USAID/T, and RTG personnel. Project implementation has been hampered by a number of factors, including personnel changes, logistical difficulties, poor communications, a lack of leadership from both USAID/T and the RTG, and, most critical – a faulty assumption in the project design that the RTG implementing agencies possessed sufficient managerial and coordination skills to achieve project goals. In fact, these agencies were inexperienced in handling A.I.D. funds, and when planned TA from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (BUCEN) was not provided, the project could not advance. Activities planned for the first stage of the project have not been accomplished and only 20% of loan funds have been disbursed. Only 2 advisors were provided (vs. 5 planned) and most project trainees are still abroad, further contributing to the ineffectiveness of TA. Further, only 2 of 4 proposed studies fall within the project”s scope and the quality of the proposals is problematical. Of the three options USAID/T faced (i.e., terminate the project, allowing completion of activities currently underway; continue the project as is, although there is no reason to assume this will lead to achievement of project goals; or revise the design, toward increased decentralization of rural development monitoring and evaluation), the Mission chose the last. The project teaches many lessons concerning project design. Radical changes during the pre-implementation stage should lead to a reexamination of the project – USAID/T should have redesigned or cancelled this project when the PASA with BUCEN fell through. Such critical implementation issues should not be relegated to the “Important Assumptions” section of the logframe; similarly, crucial interagency coordination links need to be defined before implementation. Finally, project designs should be subjected to independent and external review to reveal weaknesses and flawed assumptions. Other lessons include: (1) Grant-funded TA is more flexible than loan-funded and should have been used in this project; similarly, loan projects require stronger indigenous implementation skills; (2) Mission and counterpart staff should participate in project evaluations.
