The Ethiopian People”s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) overthrew the military dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991. Just over one year later, the interim EPRDF administration conducted regional elections which profoundly and adversely affected the course and outcomes of the Ethiopian political transition. The reasons have to do not only with the election campaign and processes themselves but with flawed strategic planning and preparations for the elections. This report will draw lessons from this experience not only for Ethiopia but for the conduct of elections in war torn societies elsewhere in Africa and beyond. The Ethiopian case melds important singular features with circumstances and parameters common to war-torn societies. The major issue in Ethiopia, however, has been how to reconcile partners in a fragile coalition of victors on the course and conduct of the transition rather than how to achieve a modus vivendi between victors and a defeated government. At the same time, in Ethiopia as in other war-torn societies, initial elections following hostilities have had an important bearing on the future shape of the postwar polity. Although no one but fringe elements defends the vanquished Mengistu regime, several of the government”s most significant opponents ardently defend national unity and a strong central government, upheld by the Mengistu regime, as more in keeping with the historic working definition of the Ethiopian than the new regime”s vision of an ethnically decentralized, almost confederal, vision of a post-imperial Ethiopian state. This report will detail how the preparations for, conduct, and outcomes of the 1992 regional elections affected crucially not only the course of the transition but also initial shape of the post-imperial Ethiopian state. The report examines in turn (1) the overall country context; (2) the 1992 regional elections; and (3) their consequences for democracy and governance, and for reconciliation processes and outcomes. It concludes by outlining the strategic and technical lessons and recommendations that follow from this review and proposes a set of priorities for implementing them. Three major lessons for assisting the conduct of initial multiparty elections in war-torn societies emerge. First, the political transitions symbolized by initial multiparty elections need to be undertaken with due regard for other transitions that are expected to occur, including demobilization of armies, conversion of armed movements into political parties, rebuilding of civil society and other political institutions, and economic rehabilitation. Second, the sequencing and timing of phases of democratization should be tailored to country circumstances. In Ethiopia, the 1992 elections should have been further delayed until more detailed and sustainable accord among the politico-military movements had been established, and possibly until after the ratification of the new Constitution. Third, donors should calibrate their commitments of diplomatic and financial resources to the importance they ascribe to democratic elections for the realization of their foreign policy interests. It is not clear that the United States did so in this case.
