Agricultural transport assistance program (ATAP) project no. 621-0166 : impact study

Interim evaluation covers the period 9/87-1/96. ATAP has had significant impact at several levels. At the institutional level, ATAP has encouraged the Government of Tanzania (GOT) to: consolidate road policy and management oversight into one ministry; transfer responsibility for construction and maintenance to the private sector; decentralize responsibility for road operations to regional offices; prioritize efforts according to social, economic, and environmental criteria as well as technical factors; review the sustainability of projects prior to funding; and increase the contract award authority of Regional Tender Boards from $10,000 to $1.0 million per project. Each reform has dramatically improved the performance of road maintenance and rehabilitation. Additional reforms are in progress. At the financial level, significantly more funds are now available to pay for road maintenance. Road users bear an increased share of the cost of maintenance, and the Ministry of Works, Communications and Transportation (MWCT) is spending Road Fund allocations in a more economical and rational manner. The Tanzania Road Fund obtains its funds solely from road user charges, primarily from the Road Toll Tax, a flat tax applied to petrol products and diesel fuel, This is a well-designed and -administered tax, and the Road Fund is one of the best established in recent years in sub-Saharan Africa. A major success was convincing the GOT to privatize road construction and maintenance. The number of private road industry contractors has increased from 30 to 500. These contractors are rehabilitating 1,700 km of roads, constructing/reconstructing 126 bridge projects, and performing design and construction supervision. Routine maintenance increased from virtually zero in 1988 to over 4,800 km in 1994, and periodic maintenance from virtually zero in 1988 to approximately 400 km in 1994. One drawback is the time it takes (occasionally over a year) to award contracts, which results in cost increases and contractor discouragement. ATAP-funded roadworks have had a profoundly positive effect on the income and social welfare of Tanzania's rural population. Traffic on some routes has increased fourfold and passenger traffic up to tenfold; passenger fares have decreased as much as 30%, vehicle operating costs by up to two-thirds, and travel times by half. Although several small retailers have closed, they have been replaced by numerous other firms, including retail shops as well as vendors at community markets. Permanent retail shops along improved roads show increased daily sales from 50% to 140%. Land values have risen significantly, often doubling or tripling, and farmers have taken advantage of reliable transport to diversify into more perishable, though more remunerative crops. Decreased local sales of alcohol are an interesting side benefit of the road improvement program, as rural populations can now easily sell their maize and do not have to brew it into beer to improve and sell it. Overall, there are increased sales of crops and increased access to agricultural inputs in areas affected by ATAP. Moreover, rural populations now have better access to health centers. People now by-pass ill-equipped local government hospitals and clinics in favor of better private and church facilities, though some of this increase must be attributed to the GOT's imposition of cost-sharing and the collection of fees for certain services. In the area of one ATAP-rehabilitated road, daily attendance at a church-sponsored hospital is up by 30%, while the government hospital serving the same area reports a 70% decrease. ATAP has also positive affected family planning services. One key to sustaining these impacts and further improving rural roads is the continued use of local, labor-based crews for road maintenance. The program's successes can be sustained; ATAP-led policy reforms have provided the critical inputs required to construct and maintain rural roads. However, the GOT is considering creating a new parastatal called TANROADS, which would increase emphasis on the use of direct hire or "force account" brigades -- even though there is a well documented history of failure in this type of effort. These two issues warrant USAID's continued attention. (Author abstract, modified)