Agroforestry : tenure and incentives

The validity of the generally accepted security of tenure model, which assumes that without land tenure security tree-planting will be discouraged, is examined in relation to three different situations. (1) Analysis of tree tenure on household agricultural holdings finds the issue more complicated than previously thought. Trees can be an object of property rights separable from the land, like water and mineral rights. In addition, tree-planting can sometimes actually increase security in land tenure. Gender issues are also relevant, since the household is not necessarily under single management (the male"s). (2) In regard to tree tenure in communal areas (e.g., village woodlots), the report details the deforestation that results when states refuse to recognize common areas, instead conferring land rights on the first person to "clear the land." Problems in developing institutional mechanisms for managing common property are also examined. (3) Analysis of tree tenure on state-managed reserves focuses on conflicts between the state and local communities over control of forests and on alternative systems, such as the "taungya" system in Asia, in which farmers were temporarily allocated areas for both tree-planting and subsistence cropping. Overall, it is concluded that while tree tenure does affect incentives, its importance varies dramatically from case to case, so that the mere elimination of tenure constraints will accomplish little. The final section of the paper suggests procedures to assess tree and tenure relationships in agroforestry project planning. A sample field questionnaire is included.