Assessment of the impact of Ethiopia"s safety net program

The highly experimental program relied to a considerable degree on regional, zonal, wereda, kebele, and peasant organizations for implementation; connected the grassroots directly with the Committee at the Prime Minister"s Office, demonstrating the potential of a new way of doing business; and raised awareness of the need to integrate the poor into the development process within all levels of government agencies. This program was timely in that it coincided with favorable economic and climate conditions, and, generally speaking, reached its intended beneficiaries: the chronic poor, refugees, returnees, and ex-soldiers. For the most part, it was cost-effective, in contrast to typical safety net programs. The "poor farmers" program was the most cost-effective. The impact of activities implemented by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRB) has been more difficult to trace, although given their similarity to the "poor farmers" program they can be assumed to have had a similar effect, and, moreover, have facilitated the peaceful reintegration of hundreds of thousands of displaced people. The "urban poor" program was beneficial but less efficient than the "poor farmers" program. Except in Tigray and possibly Amhara Regions, the program for orphans, the disabled, and elderly was the least effective, because financial transfers were made in small increments, which were inappropriate for business start-up. It is unfortunate the SNP was a one-time activity, since it may have proved how enduring benefits can be delivered to many at a surprisingly low administrative and financial cost. Finally, the "retrenched workers" component, which consumed 40% of the SNP budget but delivered services to just a few thousand, thwarted the SNP"s goal to reach the many millions of the poorest in Ethiopia. The "retrenched workers" program should be evaluated separately from the SNP.