Assistance ban study

material, money, and personnel into Afghanistan was imposed from July 17, 1991, through December 29, 1991, in response to the deteriorating security situation in the country. This study, based on in-depth interviews with Office of the A.I.D. Representative to Afghanistan (O/AID/Rep) contractors and grantees, their field staff, Afghans recently in Afghanistan, and officials from O/AID/Rep, attempts to quantify the impact of the assistance ban based on contractors" estimates of material not delivered, wages, and productivity lost, etc. In addition, it includes the views of contractors and beneficiaries on the efficacy of the ban. An attempt also is made to assess how Afghan beneficiaries and contractors managed without O/AID/Rep assistance. In the months following the ban, the initial security incidents which prompted it were resolved: (1) a French national who was detained in early July was released; (2) 2 detained Americans were released; (3) 11 stolen vehicles and most of the stolen equipment were returned. It is impossible to assess whether the assistance ban contributed to the improved security climate without knowing the details of negotiations that led to the release of the detainees and return of the stolen equipment. However, Afghans interviewed said the ban prompted some attempts (whether successful or not) by mujahideen commanders to win the release of the detainees. Viewed in the context of total international assistance to Afghanistan, the ban"s effect was marginal. According to O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees, the ban delayed for around 6 months an estimated $6.52 million in supplies, including medicines, agricultural inputs, construction equipment, and educational material. (Total FY 1991 budget for O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees was around $65 million.) This impeded, but did not shut down, cross border implementation structures. Nor did the O/AID/Rep ban affect programs financed by the United Nations, European organizations, Arab countries, or the Soviet Union. On a micro level, where particular inputs represent a much more substantial portion of individual incomes and community resources, the impact was more keenly felt. There were few indications that beneficiaries were able to find alternative inputs or incomes. People who lived near markets were able to buy some substitutes commercially, but only if they had sufficient money. Most of O/AID/Rep beneficiaries (and by definition, all of its intended beneficiaries) are the "highly vulnerable" -- people with little in the way of economic cushion or alternatives in one of the world"s poorest countries. According to the 16 O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees surveyed, the key delays/losses to beneficiaries were: (1) Medicine valued at $1.83 million was not supplied to people in need during the ban, adversely affecting 450,000 patient visits. (2) An estimated 65,000 children under the age of two were not vaccinated at the planned time because of the ban. In some cases, this reduced the effectiveness of vaccinations given prior to the ban. (3) Approximately 10,600 tons of diammonium phosphate fertilizer were not delivered, an amount that could have augmented wheat yields enough to provide wheat for at least 205,000 people for one year. (4) A 25% decrease in planned O/AID/Rep rural rehabilitation projects resulted for 1991. (5) Delivery of 350,000 - 400,000 textbooks was delayed. (6) Detection (by RONCO mine detection dogs) of an estimated 500 mines and fragments was delayed, undoubtedly creating some cost in life, limb, and property. (7) Wages worth $1.5 million to more than 5,000 casual laborers were lost, affecting an estimated 35,000 dependents. (8) An estimated $220,000 was spent paying the salaries to project staff idled or in training programs in Pakistan who would have been working in Afghanistan were it not for the ban. (9) O/AID/Rep projects incurred approximately $90,000 in additional cost in per diem salaries, storage costs, and other unexpected expenses caused by the ban. As for contractor and Afghan perceptions, most contractors and Afghan field staff reported that the assistance ban had little impact on the security situation in Afghanistan. The message was lost in the enormity of the ban. (1) Most Afghan villagers either were not aware of the ban or did not understand why it had been imposed. Many mujahideen commanders continued to receive shipments of lethal military equipment (from the U.S.-Iraq war and elsewhere), diluting the financial impact of the suspension in humanitarian assistance. (2) The scope of the ban was much broader than the area affected by the security situation. While the concept of collective responsibility is familiar to most Afghans at a family or tribal level, the fragmented political situation in the country made it impossible for most Afghan villagers or even mujahideen commanders to influence the behavior of commander in distant provinces. Afghans reported that most did not understand why they were being "punished" for events over which they had no control. (3) Some mujahideen commanders did attempt to negotiate for the release of the American detainees. However, it was reported that these efforts enhanced the prestige of the kidnappers and raised the political "price" of releasing the detainees. (4) The absence of a written policy explaining the suspension left its intent open to varied interpretations. While some of the Afghans interviewed said they understood the connection between the ban and the security situation, many said that they viewed it as a sign that U.S. commitment to the mujahideen was waning. The U.S.-USSR (Russian) agreement to stop all military assistance to Afghanistan as of January 1, 1992, and continuing efforts by UN negotiators to find a peaceful settlement to the war reinforced the perception among many Afghans that the United States was imposing the ban in an attempt to force the mujahideen to make peace with the Communist regime in Kabul. (5) The assistance ban also undermined the credibility of the United States as an aid donor. Two Afghans reported that Iran had sent missions to Afghanistan to tell villagers that the United States was unreliable and that they should turn to Iran for future assistance. One Afghan said Saudi Arabia increased its influence in Afghanistan as a result of the assistance ban. (6) Finally, most Afghans and contractors agreed that the ban did little to enhance the security of American projects or personnel in the long run. Instead, they said, such policies give Afghans the impression that the American commitment is temporary and thus increases the likelihood of future security problems. Contractors said that safety for American projects and personnel would be better secured by working with local village leaders, relying -- when possible -- on local transportation and distribution systems, enforcing O/AID/Rep"s policy of not paying money to mujahideen commanders, and focusing any future economic sanction specifically on commanders and regions where security problems persist. (Author abstract)