Democratic and electoral processes project : evaluation of the citizen participation component of USAID/El Salvador"s project no. 519-0391 -- final report

The project was implemented by Creative Associates International, Inc. (CREA). Overall, the majority of CIVICA"s pilot activities successfully met their objectives, and most have been sustained, even after project support ended. Perhaps even more important are the unintended results achieved, mainly the collaborative working relationship that has developed between eight Salvadoran NGOs from different parts of the political/ideological spectrum -- something that would have seemed impossible a few years ago. By virtue of the confidence garnered by CREA staff and the method applied for joint NGO activities, those organizations have learned to reach consensus on subject matter, activity sites and dates, the materials used, and related issues. This, in turn, has encouraged those organizations which, responding to an evolving environment, have decided to opt for autonomy and independence from political parties -- which in some cases has cost them dearly in terms of material support. In short, had the future been known when this project began, longer-term planning could have produced even more effective and efficient results. Meanwhile, the importance of the results achieved, intended and unintended, should not be underestimated. The contractor has accumulated an abundance of information on subprojects and the organizations that implemented them. It is estimated that over 8,000 Salvadorans in some 75 municipalities and nearly 200 communities in all 14 Departments were reached directly by this project. Though overall data are not sex-disaggregated (despite the fact that women were one of the target populations), such information could probably be reconstructed fairly easily by those involved. Judging by the number of participants in activities aimed specifically at women, plus other project data, it is estimated that females were probably 30-45% of those reached. Given that some pilots involved communal radio or other media at one time or another, it is not possible to estimate the total number of citizens reached indirectly by the project. Phase II activities, on which this evaluation focuses, were implemented between 4/94 and 7/96, in four rounds. (1) During Round One, CREA invited some 100 NGOs to submit proposals for civic education projects. Though the application form was simple, CREA had to provide individualized TA to develop proposals that USAID could approve, despite the fact that institutional strengthening was excluded from the contract. This process resulted in the approval of 7 projects carried out by 17 NGOs, some of which worked in groups. A number of these activities, particularly those targeting women, are being institutionalized. (2) During Round Two, CREA introduced the deliberative forum method for citizen participation created in the United States by the Kettering Foundation. The 7 NGOs selected to work on this project, Youth for Democracy, were given training in the Kettering method, along with follow-on TA. The project addressed poverty, violence, and the Peace Accords. The implementing NGOs have incorporated this deliberative method into other projects. (3) During Round Three, changes were made to adapt the Kettering approach to El Salvador"s education and cultural realities so that it would stimulate greater participation in the deliberative process. Beginning in Round Three, a conscious attempt was made to involve local government officials in project activities. While results were mixed, many mayors and town council members did participate and support local and departmental forums. (4) Round Four was dedicated to the issue of citizens safety, which many showed interest in during Round Three. Fifteen Departmental forums were held on citizens safety; these yielded a synthesis of causes and solutions to citizens safety issues, which will be presented to the GOES and to the media. The project suffered from some shortcomings. (1) Because of its experimental nature, the project"s greatest weakness has been its short-term focus and lack of follow on support for successful pilot activities, as well as the absence of overall strategic direction in the post-election phase. (2) Delays and false starts were occasioned by the requirement that the Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI) pre-approve all activities and written materials to be used by implementors. While USAID felt that this was a necessary requirement, given the sensitive nature of the subject, the Mission underestimated the management burden this would cause, and was therefore ill-prepared to provide timely responses. (3) The project missed opportunities to involve more NGOs in the Kettering training; recruit a greater variety of implementors in Round Two and beyond; and employ additional methodologies in those Rounds, even as control mechanisms to measure the comparative effectiveness of Kettering. (4) CIVICA and USAID"s Municipal Development and Citizen Participation (MDCP) project (whose participation component is also carried out by CREA), showed virtually no coordination, reducing the Mission"s ability to capitalize on those investments by leveraging activities and results.