Democratic initiatives project (656-0227) : mid-term evaluation

Midterm evaluation covers the period 9/91-3/95. Progress in the project's four components is as follows. Outputs of the election component, by far the project's most important, are nearly complete. End-of-Project Status (EOPS) was achieved with the holding of the October 1994 multiparty elections, which saw a turnout of some 87% of registered voters. However, midterm sustainability of the electoral process is in doubt. Progress has been far less in the other three components. None of the outputs under the Judicial Sector Strengthening outputs, with the exception of the legal sector assessment, have been completed and are unlikely to be completed. EOPS is unlikely to be completed before 12/31/96. Outputs in both the Decentralization/Traditional Authority and the Civil Society components are less than 10% completed and are unlikely to be completed by the PACD; further, although EOPS are being achieved in these components, it is not as a result of project activities. In terms of the election component, the project has been a resounding success. Multi-party elections have led to the installation of a democratically elected government, thereby effecting the transition from war to peace and establishing a foundation for a stable democratic society. However, the historical power asymmetries which define much of the past 400 years are still in place, particularly in relation to civil society and local government. The slow progress of the other three components is not considered particularly unusual within the larger framework of the Mission's Transition Program. In fact, it is only with the elections safely behind that these other more developmental components have a realistic chance of being implemented; that elections -- particularly first-time elections -- always dominate the agenda in democratization projects, should be kept in mind in designing future such projects. Other lessons learned are as follows. (1) First-time elections in countries emerging from war indicate a transition from war to peace much more than they do a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Hence, assistance provided in the domain of democracy and governance is unlikely to lead to the full achievement of objectives in these areas. (2) In a transition situation, there is likely to be a convergence of foreign policy and development assistance, leading to the achievement of both. As economic and political stabilization are achieved, the two will begin to diverge, as the longer-term and strategic nature of development assistance begins to conflict (at the implementation, not at the policy level), with the short-term and tactical needs of foreign policy. (3) Decisions to use an intermediary to channel and manage development assistance on behalf of USAID to one or more implementing agents should be based primarily on programmatic needs, not on the administrative ease that this procedure may afford overstretched bureaucracies. (4) Democratic development in general and democracy and governance programs in particular are risky undertakings and must be based on the assumption that failure is as likely an outcome as success. In the case of Mozambique, the benefits are worth the inherent risks.