Evaluation of the African emergency food assistance program in Sudan, 1984-1985

Although the program critically benefitted millions of people, it could have had greater impact and been more cost effective. A.I.D.'s plans to have foods in position prior to the rainy season failed, causing serious delays and shortfalls in food delivery. As a partial result, timeliness was a continuing problem -- nearly 12 months elapsed between each USAID/S request and full distribution of the foods requested. An added problem was the inability of other agencies and the host government to meet their obligations on time. Program management was good given the small and inexperienced USAID/S staff, AID/W's inflexible management system, and a decision to coordinate with other donors at the country level (thus placing the burden on USAID/S). USAID/S effectively used the private sector, local governments, and private voluntary organizations (PVO's) in managing the program, a strategy that helped develop local food emergency capacities. On the other hand, USAID/S's failure to link the food emergency with long-term development led to very late rehabilitation responses. PVO's proved especially effective, but private contractors were reluctant to deliver food to remote areas. Rural people, especially in those areas, received too little food and did not receive it when needed. remote villages by 11/85, just as most of the neediest had exhausted their monetary and often their nutritional reserves. The program did substantially limit migration out of villages, but initiated supplemental feeding late and health inputs hardly at all. Title II monetization in urban areas did not work well due to lack of distribution and financial controls.