Evaluation of the development of democratic institutions project

(AMIDEAST) to promote the development of democratic institutions in the Middle East (DDI project). Interim, participatory evaluation covers the period 7/91-1995; personnel of both USAID/ANE and AMIDEAST were included on the evaluation team. AMIDEAST has carried out democracy/governance activities in the six targeted countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon) as well as in the West Bank and Gaza and at the regional level. These have included needs assessments, training staff of democratic institutions, arranging conferences, providing short-term TA, and serving as intermediary with indigenous partners in cases where political, legal, or other reasons prevent U.S. Government offices from doing so directly. AMIDEAST has sought to integrate activities so that strengthening an institution in one target area would complement work in another; its work with NGOs exemplifies this approach. Nonetheless, many factors largely beyond AMIDEAST's control affect the progress of democratization in the region, including the political environments of host countries and institutional and policy changes within USAID and its Missions. The project has achieved modest success in building up AMIDEAST's capacity for DDI programming. AMIDEAST field staff appear to have developed sound knowledge of aspects of DDI programming with which they have been heavily involved (e.g., management of country assessment teams, and parliamentary computerization). Nonetheless, the project has been overly Washington-centered. There has been no structured training, exposure, or interaction among field offices to develop field personnel's understanding of democratization issues and strategies. Also, some of the money originally programmed for field activities were redirected to the administrative budget; this is partly a shortcoming of AMIDEAST and partly due to USAID decisions. The project has also been hampered by the involvement of too many U.S. government personnel, both in Washington and the Near East, in both major and minor decisions, at times resulting in conflicting guidance for AMIDEAST. Despite good intentions, the net result has been to stymie the project and pull it in inconsistent, even counterproductive directions. The project has also been hampered by exogenous factors, such as the civil war in Yemen, and the fact that the Jordan-Israel peace process has contributed to a more sensitive programming environment in Jordan. Some think the project's aimed to make AMIDEAST the Near Eastern equivalent of The Asia Foundation (TAF), which undertakes democratic development work in Asia. In many respects, it is not appropriate to compare the two (TAF, unlike AMIDEAST, receives an annual appropriation from Congress, focuses on democratic development, and operates in countries with a relatively more open programming environment), yet TAF is a useful model in that its expertise, decisions, and programming impetus are very much field-based, and it builds on its field experience to develop an independent perspective in proposing projects to USAID. In addition, there in concern among some USAID staff as to whether and how well AMIDEAST assesses whether the governmental and NGO leaders it chooses to work with truly possess the will for political reform. AMIDEAST field staff are capable of making such assessments, but have tended to do in only a narrow sense, perhaps because they are uncertain whether they are supposed to lead or follow USAID's thinking. While AMIDEAST has made progress toward financial sustainability for its DDI operations, this progress flows mainly from USAID support; raising funds from foundations and other private sources has proven problematic for AMIDEAST. AMIDEAST is spending a lot of time and money developing proposals aimed at expanding its DDI portfolio; perhaps some of these resources should be put instead into field activities that will build its democratization expertise. It is recommended that future USAID efforts to strengthen intermediary organizations such as AMIDEAST should focus on (1) building the knowledge and experience of field personnel and (as a secondary priority) other staff in key program areas, rather than merely providing general support for staff salaries, and (2) planning at the outset what capacities will be strengthened and how this will be done. Such project should be flexible, perhaps by providing a grant that concentrates funding in the field offices and gives them the authority to decide how to spend the funds, subject to a "no objection" review by USAID Missions.