Evaluation of UMOJA II : an experimental housing project in Nairobi

External evaluation covers the period 1979-1/89. The project has succeeded in reaching low-income beneficiaries, although the objective of owner-occupancy has not been met. Beneficiaries are increasingly subletting the units to tenants of a slightly higher income group; currently two-thirds of the houses are so occupied. This tendency is seen as unavoidable, since housing investment is viewed in Nairobi as a means of maximizing income. The project's innovative concept of allowing several households to share a plot on a condominium basis has had a tremendous effect on increasing densities in regard to the number of housing units and the number of persons per ha, while the infrastuctural and building standards are a major breakthrough in Nairobi's formal low-income housing sector. In general, the housing projects are well appreciated for their accompanying community facilities (i.e., schools, nurseries, markets, and clinics) and the security provided by the courtyard design. Criticism has focused on unclean drains, small room size, and the location of the cooking area and shower rooms. The NCC's complex, cumbersome administrative/political structure led to selection of an unqualified contractor and delays in standards and design approvals. Furthermore, due to internal NCC coordination flaws, financial and legal problems were left unattended until a crisis developed. Overall project costs have soared (from KSh. 212 million to KSh. 410 million) for several reasons: (1) severe implementation delays, (2) rising construction costs, (3) faulty construction work, and (4) changes in contractors. As a result, A.I.D. funds are insufficient to finalize the project and NCC does not have the resources to make up the deficit. Thus, the NCC may be able to construct only 7 of the 8 planned project zones. Coupled with the high level of defaults on monthly payments, the financial shortfall has impeded plans to set up a housing development fund. All parties agreed that a clearly defined technical and financial monitoring system sponsored by A.I.D. would have prevented some of these problems. A total of 12 recommendations are made regarding the completion and replicability of Umoja II and future USAID/K support to NCC.