Evaluation of US Government response to 1991/92 Southern Africa drought -- country report : Lesotho

food aid to Lesotho following upon the 1991-92 drought in southern Africa was provided as part of a regional multi-donor effort, administered by the UN"s World Food Programme (WFP). While the decision to turn over food distribution to WFP facilitated the movement of huge quantities of food, the strategy used by WFP was essentially the same for chronically food-deficit countries -- like Lesotho -- and traditionally food-surplus countries. USAID/Maseru, had it been given the chance, could have better tailored the U.S. drought response to the specific conditions of Lesotho. In any case, lack of a generally accepted definition of Lesotho"s structural food deficit left the WFP without a technical basis for determining how much food over and above stocks handled through normal channels were to be imported into Lesotho as drought relief. In light of the well-established commercial channels for cereal importation and distribution, donors might have better served vulnerable groups by monetizing relief cereals, distributing cereal products such as maize meal through commercial networks, and using the receipts generated to provide the most vulnerable households with the means (e.g., vouchers) to access normal commercial channels. To the extent that food distributions were not free, it would have been more appropriate for Lesotho"s monetized economy to design cash-for-work, rather than food-for-work programs. While a lack of baseline data made it impossible to distinguish between the chronically poor and those suffering as a direct result of the drought, such distinctions are, according to UNICEF, unacceptable in local communities being served. At early planning meetings, Save the Children Federation (SCF) and CARE, both with extensive experience in providing emergency drought relief assistance, had reservations about the practicality of a targeted approach, considering the inaccessibility of many Lesotho mountain villages. Seemingly, WFP never addressed the issue, and neither CARE nor SCF were invited to follow-up meetings. The following lessons were learned. (1) Lesotho"s fundamental food insecurity issues are chronic -- WFP is already feeding up to 30% of the Basotho population through programmed feeding programs -- and cannot be resolved through an ad hoc emergency relief program. Lesotho must make fundamental changes in its land management system and in its agricultural practices. At present, the country"s food security is most directly linked to South Africa, as a food-surplus neighbor; however, continuation of this link cannot be guaranteed, given the political changes in South Africa. (2) Standardized relief procedures are needed. Tapping into the experience of international disaster relief organizations (e.g., the International Red Cross, CARE, and SCF) as reflected in their operations manuals and training materials is vital to the success of fledgling relief organizations like Lesotho"s Disaster Relief Implementation Group. (3) The development strategy of any drought-prone country should include drought preparedness, response, and recovery strategies, covering not only drought-tolerant plant varieties and soil and water conservation strategies, but also rural work projects that increase the income needed to purchase food. (4) The Lesotho government and NGOs could better reach rural populations by decentralizing food security administration to the district and village levels. (5) Properly planned and implemented drought relief efforts should not engender dependency. The danger for creating dependence exists when the government confuses drought relief with development and then seeks to capitalize on a temporary emergency to further its development objectives.