Evaluation of USAID/Madagascar's cyclone recovery program (CRP)

LDI funding has been used effectively to repair farm-to-market roads, repair and rehabilitate irrigation systems, provide training and assistance with grain stores, fish ponds, and facilitate local community planning to better prepare for future cyclones. The ReCAP contract used funds to improve farm-to-market roads, help establish and train local community associations to manage and maintain those roads, and repair Manakara's port facilities. The FCE-R contract has focused on rehabilitation and maintenance of the 163-KM Fianarantsoa to Manakara rail line. USAID/Madagascar and contract staff worked collectively to effect results that are greater than the sum of the three parts. In Fianarantsoa the rail line cuts through the forest corridor where USAID has funded activities for more than a decade; LDI is a continuation of some of those efforts. With the railroad as the core, the rehabilitation activities of the other two contracts complement one another and focus economic activities on settled farming and away from slash and burn tavy practices that threaten the forest's rich biodiversity. Further north in the Moramanga Region of Tamatave Province, CRP funding, utilized through LDI activities and ReCAP, focused on road construction, with emphasis on restarting production in zones of high agricultural productivity. Once again, these activities complement and bolster one another. Because the geology of this area is even more fragile than in the other CRP areas, and where another nearby forest corridor is also being threatened by land clearing, there is a definite effort to refocus local farmers agricultural and accompanying economic activities in the irrigated perimeters around the lake. LDI's activities are helping to do that, and ReCAP roads should facilitate access to wider Malagasy markets. The period covered by the CRP funding is short: 2 years or a little more, in the case of all three contracts. Madagascar is a difficult place in which to work and the rural infrastructure is in a sad state of neglect and will likely stay that way for some time to come. With intense rainy seasons and regularly recurring cyclones, progress is difficult. Further curtailing the CRP was the recent (6-month long) political crisis that slowed most activities to a standstill, making CRP achievements even more remarkable. Lessons learned are as follows: (1) The development of cyclone preparedness plans have provided a unique and participatory process that encourages ownership and forward planning in local communities. This process certainly warrants greater dissemination. (2) The use of subcontractors needs to be carefully examined on a contract-by-contract basis. There may be better use of the primary contractors staff in some situations, and thus a better (more effective) use of finances. (3) The excellent use of local labor in "labor-intensive-public-works" in communities that really have shown considerable initiative and concern for the FCE railway is certain to be utilized in future projects. This, coupled with the use of appropriate technology, can keep down costs and, more importantly, show local communities that they do have some ownership of the project. (4) The technical packages for agricultural development -- e.g., use of vetiver grass for stabilization -- are replicable in other geographic areas. (5) Experiences from the LDI contract have shown that the flexibility in budget line items enabled contract staff to address unforeseen issues, an extremely important aspect, especially in an emergency and rehabilitation situations. (6) The need to provide quarterly and financial reports on the two tranches of allocated funds seemed to be excessive and a poor use of resources. (7) There is a need for more explicit contracts with main subcontractors, with particular care given to the warranty period and its supervision. In the ReCAP contract this is the year-long period following completion of the roads and the subcontractors responsibility to repair damage due to normal wear and tear of the road. (8) There could be better technical supervision of the local engineering contractor (Lalana). Selection of a technical specialists with pertinent experience should be more carefully undertaken. Management of the ReCAP contract could have been enhanced with road design and construction engineering experience figuring more prominently in the level of effort contracted. (9) The level of effort for the ReCAP Project was insufficient for proper supervision and was poorly utilized in the use of short-term TA inputs.