Final report : evaluation of the Sudan transitional assistance for rehabilitation (STAR) program

STAR encompassed four components: grant making/capacity building, a microfinance program; civil administration training; strategic analysis/capacity building, aimed at the agricultural and natural resource management sectors; and social organizations and rehabilitation (SOAR), designed to improve the role of law, reconstruct school facilities, and improve health administration in southern and eastern Sudan. STAR was generally successful in achieving its objectives, helping to establish a basic framework of local governance and creating awareness on the part of senior public administrators of the need for accountability and transparency in managing and monitoring budgeting and accounting. But STAR also showed the difficulties inherent in launching a relief to development transition program without first ensuring the existence of a competent and well-trained civil authority to implement it, and an enabling environment. The creation of county development committees (CDCs) was a step forward in increasing civilian participation in community-level administration, rehabilitation, and small-scale economic development programs. Another step forward was the establishment of the Development Assistance Technical Team by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to serve as a catalyst in mobilizing resources from development partners and in working with them to reduce the area's heavy dependence on relief while increasing donor support for productive economic activities. The difficulties encountered by the CDCs in managing microfinance programs indicate that they were more suited to analyzing local constraints to development and finding ways to overcome these constraints on a decentralized basis. As county-level development-oriented institutions, the CDCs are well positioned to bring TA to bear where it is most needed to resolve local problems and to serve as a managerial and technical backstop. They are also well positioned and appropriately staffed to identify, initiate, direct, and manage public sector investments in new economic capacity, provided they find ways to underwrite the cost of implementing these activities. While interviews generally confirmed the view that, since 1998, living conditions have improved in most of the stable opposition-administered areas where STAR has operated, there are no quality of life indicators or welfare indexes to support this finding. Abundant rainfall, reduced levels of inter-tribal conflict, and agricultural surpluses were viewed as key factors behind the improvement. The ongoing war, its impact on agricultural trade, a transport system in disarray, the lack of a common currency, the lack of transparency in applying SPLM tax collection and fiscal measures, and inadequate financial management and budgeting systems were key constraints to achieving greater progress. Limited progress was made in filling key positions in the civil authorities and in developing policy and regulatory frameworks for governing. Considerably less progress was made in increasing levels of accountability, transparency, and respect for human rights among civil authorities, and in increasing the capacity of institutions to foster democratization and good governance. It is unlikely that the projects initiated under STAR will be able to continue operation once the implementing partners cease active involvement in a project's functioning. STAR did not significantly increase the representation and decisionmaking power of women. This can be attributed to the absence of a strategic plan to address gender issues, lack of consultation with stakeholders on how to address the gender gap, and lack of in-depth awareness of gender issues at the donor level and among partners. Includes recommendations for STAR II.