Final report : Latin American and Caribbean trade and investment development project

The project assisted some countries, including El Salvador, Haiti, and Jamaica, in assessing and enhancing their trade and investment (T/I) regulatory regimes and drafting legislative initiatives to that end; it also made recommendations for improving administrative structures and procedures. Most of its regional activities, including its telecommunications and trade data studies, were positively received. Legal regulatory activities in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Haiti evoked positive responses from national governmental authorities. In addition, the project demonstrated that it could respond efficiently and effectively to urgent requests for TA and services. It was particularly praised for its response to USAID/Haiti"s requests for five different TA interventions to support the Emergency Economic Recovery Program and the Presidential Commission on Economic Modernization and Growth. From its very beginnings, however, the project was severely constrained by a number of external events. During its first month of operation, the famous "60 Minutes" broadcast was aired, resulting in a number of impacts, including the imposition of Section 599, which raised concerns about project activities related to investment promotion in the LAC region. Then a series of external and internal reorganizations deprived the project of meaningful USAID direction; as a result of USAID/W inaction, the project, designed as a regional and subregional, proactive Washington-directed activity, became a reactive, Mission-driven activity that was never adequately marketed to Missions. Consequently, little was accomplished within the project"s first year. There were other problems that affected project activities. Too often it was used as a substitute for internal Mission professional competency, e.g., asked to draft program documents and amendments of an internal operational nature -- an actively not originally contemplated for the project. Also, some of its technical studies and recommendations were undermined by timidity or unrelated political or diplomatic concerns on the part of Missions, while some of its proposed activities were undermined by USAID/LAC/TI"s failure properly to advance and coordinate these possibilities within the U.S. government. Quantitatively, the project responded to 31 Technical Service Orders (TSOs) and produced a series of 8 substantive memoranda prepared by the Project Director, providing information and analyses of various aspects of international trade and investment.