Final report : strategy for Guatemalan democratic initiatives

Major conclusions are as follows. (1) With the partial exception of the Regional Administration of Justice Project, USAID/G has not been significantly involved in preparing or implementing activities under the various regional projects aimed at strengthening democracy. Nor, except for the recently undertaken bilateral Improved Administration of Justice Project (IAJP), has USAID/G performed the degree of analysis and preparation or supervision of the activities in support of strengthening democracy as is normal in other areas of A.I.D."s concern. Topics related to the strengthening of democracy have not been included in policy dialogue, primarily due to the Mission"s view that it must be extremely careful not to be seen as pressuring Guatemalan entities to take measures in this field and to its deference to the expertise of those who presented themselves as intermediaries for work in this area. (2) Again except for the IAJP, USAID/G has provided its assistance either through grants to local institutions (e.g.,the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Office of the Procurador of Human Rights) or through Cooperative Agreements in response to unsolicited proposals (e.g., with Harvard Law School and the Center for Democracy). These activities have had some success: the elections of 1985 and 1988 were successfully held; the Office of the Procurador of Human Rights is functioning; a program of seminars for Congressmen has been undertaken and Harvard Law School has initiated discussions with high-level representatives of the justice sector, provided training for judges and prosecutors, and undertaken a program to try reforms in a series of model courts. However, except for the Harvard program, none of the activities amounts to a long-term strengthening of the Guatemalan institution involved. (3) By far the most thorough approach has been IAJP"s work with the court system. (4) USAID/G strategy in the area of democratic initiatives basically involves initial, tentative approaches and includes activities whose impact on the strengthening of democracy are indirect at best. (5) The very sizeable Mission projects supporting training were not used directly to strengthen democratic institutions or practices. (6) USAID/G has had difficulty in managing activities concerning the strengthening of democracy, but has taken several steps to improve its capacity to do so. These steps are not likely to be sufficient to meet the demands of an expanded program, however. Specific recommendations are made for a program with 5 elements: expansion of the IAJP to its original scope, including programs with the Ministerio Publico, the defense counsel system, and initiation of a public education campaign; strengthening of the legislative branch; consolidation of the electoral system (third priority only because the system has made such good progress already); development of a civic education campaign; and an effort to strengthen public rejection of the use of violence or the threat of violence in private and public disputes. In carrying out this program the Mission will face a much larger and should rely more on contracts and less on grants and Cooperative Agreements. (Author abstract, modified)