Intercountry evaluation of AID land scale guaranty programs : Ecuador and Costa Rica
Sign inUSAID. BUR. FOR LATIN AMERICA. OFC. OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
THE LAND SALE GUARANTY PROGRAMS IN BOTH ECUADOR AND COSTA RICA WERE BASED ON TWO MAJOR PREMISES.
Goldstein, Bernice A.; House, R. A. · 1970

Abstract
ONE WAS THAT THERE WERE LAND OWNERS WILLING TO SELL LAND TO SMALL FARMERS AT REASONABLE PRICES AND ON REASONABLE TERMS, PROVIDED THEY WERE GIVEN A GUARANTY OF PAYMENT. THE SECOND PREMISE WAS THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS SMALL FARMERS WHO HAD A STRONG DESIRE TO OWN LAND. IN ECUADOR THE FIRST PREMISE WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE A NEW GOVERNMENT INSTITUTED PROGRAMS THAT MADE UNNECESSARY THE NEED FOR AID"S LAND SALE GUARANTY PROGRAM. IN COSTA RICA THE FIRST PREMISE DID NOT HOLD BECAUSE LANDOWNERS REQUIRED LARGE DOWNPAYMENTS. THE LACK OF MONEY FOR DOWNPAYMENTS WAS PROBABLY THE SINGLE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE LIMITED USE OF THE PROGRAM. ONLY FIVE CAMPESINO GROUPS OF 21 MEMBERS EACH PARTICIPATED. IN BOTH COUNTRIES THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE AID REQUIREMENT WHICH PREVENTED GUARANTY FUNDS FROM BEING DISBURSED UNTIL THERE WAS AN ACTUAL CALL ON THE GUARANTY. INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT IS A CHECKLIST OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS A GROUP MAY ENCOUNTER IN ATTEMPTS TO OWN AND OPERATE A FARM COLLECTIVELY. THEY CONCERN LEGAL STATUS OF THE GROUP, ITS SOCIAL COMPOSITION, GOVERNMENT, SKILLS, PAST EXPERIENCES, ACQUISITION OF LAND, USE OF GOVERNMENT BONDS FOR PAYMENT TO LANDOWNERS, WORK ROLES, CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, CREDIT, TRAINING, AUXILIARY SERVICES AND HOUSING, AND MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.
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Classification
USAID DEC