Irrigation support project for Asia and Near East

Interim evaluation, conducted 5 years into the project, covered the period 1986-11/91 and took the place of two previously scheduled evaluations which were not carried out due to lack of Bureau funds. ISPAN has been very effective. To date, 116 activities, 69 of them completed, have been undertaken. The quality of support to the Missions in managing their irrigation portfolios has ranged from good to excellent, and new activities have been added, in response to Missions" needs and to recurring calamities, in the areas of environment, flood control, and water strategy development. The quality of the personnel fielded and of the reports delivered, as well as the timeliness of the actions taken, were generally very good to excellent. Of 12 Missions surveyed, 11 rated ISPAN as relevant to their expressed needs and those of the host country. ISPAN has experienced many adverse circumstances, including changing program priorities, curtailment of core funds, delays due to the Persian Gulf War, and dependence on Mission buy-ins. Based on the flexibility demonstrated by ISPAN professionals, however, the contract has remained viable. However, deficiencies exist in the contractor"s organizational structure, work planning, reporting of results, answering of communications from abroad, and development of a management information system. It is recommended that A.I.D. extend the current contract to the original 1994 PACD and raise the project"s spending ceiling to reflect the entire cost of the Eastern Waters Initiative and water resources strategy development. Increased dissemination of project information is also urged. Finally, a PID for a follow-on project should be developed. While generally accepting the evaluation, A.I.D. rejected a recommendation to change the project"s name to reflect its broadened scope. It did, however, schedule a workshop to address problems in ISPAN"s organizational structure. Several lessons have been learned. (1) Irrigation issues must be considered in the context of the total water sector. (2) The 1990 decision to cut core funds demonstrates the powerful effect that negative opinions on the part of high-ranking A.I.D. officials can have on a project. A.I.D. cannot expect a project to fully succeed when A.I.D. itself fails to live up to its commitment. (3) Innovative and skillful champions and an effective steering committee are key ingredients of project success, as witnessed by the vacuum created by the departure of ISPAN designers from the Agency (or at least from A.I.D./W). (4) Mission buy-ins proved an efficient mechanism for funding field activities. (5) Consortium proposals involving PVOs, minority-owned firms, and universities may be more likely to win a contract, but do not necessarily provide a better product or a guarantee that other members of the consortium will provide the services contracted. (6) ISPAN and related projects show that A.I.D."s comparative advantage in the water resources sector lies not in building infrastructure but in management, environmental issues, sustainability, and training.