Lessons learned' desk top evaluation : administration of justice project no. 527-0303

In the early years of the project, 23 subprojects were created, some with budgets as small as $5,000, under five main components: organizational; training and professional training; planning, studies, and modernization of procedures; outreach; and basic equipment. Due to the limited operational capacity of the GOP implementing institutions, a 9/92 project amendment shifted implementation responsibilities from them to USAID and reduced the number of subprojects from 23 to 4: special courts, accusatorial system, court administration, and policy options. The pace of project implementation increased significantly thereafter, when many of the project's principal achievements were made. The project's most important tangible achievements were the casetracking system installed in the Public Ministry, the training programs developed in the Judicial Branch and the Public Ministry, and finally, the National Registry of Detainees, which remains under development in the Public Ministry and the Ministry of Interior. More important, however, were its intangible benefits. For example, the project helped the GOP learn many lessons concerning the reform of the judicial sector. The Public Ministry benefitted the most and the Judicial Branch the least. The Ministry of Justice benefitted indirectly from the project through its relationships with individuals and NGOs that were close to the project. Toward the end of the LOP, judicial reform became a major topic of concern to the GOP, the Peruvian public, and other members of the international donor community, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The project can take considerable credit for being the forerunner in the provision of assistance to a sector that is now widely recognized by the donor community as being a key component of sustainable development. USAID itself learned much about the process of judicial reform in the course of project implementation. What the project actually achieved was often quite different from what was specified in the original design and the 1992 amendment, both of which were overly dependent on the political winds then prevailing. These design flaws also hindered the project from responding to emerging opportunities. In fact, some of the most interesting judicial reform activities, including the TA for the reorganization of the Public Ministry and the implementation of the Office of the Court Administrator, and the first year of the development of the National Registry of Detainees, were not even financed under the project, but by Program Development and Support (PD&S) funds. In these circumstances, the project cannot justly be evaluated in light of the end-of-project indicators contained in the design documents. Other findings are as follows. (1) Successful management of the project required a high level of organization, the fulfillment of numerous administrative processes, an in-depth understanding of the judicial system, and a prolonged political commitment to judicial reform on the part of all parties involved. Lacking each of these to some extent, project implementation was slow and cumbersome, particularly during its initial phases. (2) Constant personnel changes, together with staff reductions and repeated and prolonged strikes, greatly limited the ability of the GOP institutions to implement the project adequately. A related problem was the highly conservative nature of the traditional aspects of the judicial sector. The GOP authorities involved in the project were often unwilling to make necessary decisions that would have required compromise and change in their highly tradition-bound institutions. The requirement that they cooperate with one another clashed with judicial sector traditions of inter-institutional competition and jealousy.