USAID. MISSION TO PAKISTAN
PACR of a project (5/83-6/93) to increase the efficient, reliable, and equitable distribution of irrigation water in Pakistan.
1994

Abstract
The project met most of its objectives, though its sustainability is in question. More specifically, it: (1) rehabilitated 1,581 km of canals and 5,500 km of drains; (2) provided the four Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs) the institutional capability to collect hydraulic and sedimentation data and perform computer-aided designs, thus simplifying future redesigns and potentially saving substantial amounts in operation and maintenance (O&M) for the enormous Indus Basin irrigation system; (3) upgraded O&M by preparing manuals and cost guidelines, ensuring that PIDs received adequate O&M funds, and developing a plan for full O&M cost recovery by 1997 (although it is doubtful the plan will be implemented in its entirety); and (4) improved the institutional capabilities of PIDs and central line agencies via computerization, improved information and personnel management, extensive TA and training, and provision of equipment to improve mechanical engineering. The project trained 13 Ph.D."s, 78 M.S."s, and 91 B.S."s, and held short courses overseas for 549 persons and in Pakistan for 2,590. In the command water management component, the project: (1) completed extensive civil works, rehabilitating 1,351 watercourses, establishing over 1,000 demonstration plots, precision leveling of 20,000 acres, setting up 8 weather stations and 48 water-level recording stations, and constructing demonstration field drains; (2) established more than 1,000 water users associations; (3) supported numerous technical interventions and innovations; and (4) solved the politically destabilizing water shortage in North West Frontier Province by replacing pumps and electric motors in the Warsak Life Canal Pump House. Research accomplishments included, inter alia, 8 water management studies and a vast program of very successful research conducted under an agreement with International Irrigation Management Institute, including 22 studies by Pakistani entities. The following lessons were learned. (1) Achievement of sustainable development in Pakistan will require extensive institutional and political reform. Not only are the private sector, community groups, farmers, and individuals at the mercy of an unsympathetic government which regulates every activity in the country, but the huge, unwieldy, and inefficient bureaucracy consumes most of the already scarce funds in salaries and administrative costs, leading to dependence on donor support to restore facilities that are constantly deteriorating. The key lesson here is the need to carry out assessments of a country"s institutional capability before undertaking a development project. (2) While rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure was a suitable project objective, the effect will be lost in 3-5 years unless sustainability is assured. (3) Expatriate TA is not needed in Pakistan for projects like this, as there is a wide base of indigenous expertise. (4) U.S. training should be limited to graduate and postgraduate levels; U.S. short courses had little to offer, and the nominating process for these was abused by the GOP. (5) It is more efficient to procure commodities through the GOP under USAID supervision rather than through procurement service agents. Also, donors should emphasize use of the private sector in providing construction equipment and workshop support to PIDs. The project has only limited sustainability due in part to the Pressler amendment, which curtailed project efforts at a crucial stage of policy dialogue. Although the project did bring about a significant change in the attitudes of GOP policy makers toward irrigation and the entire agricultural sector, there are still vested interests standing in the way of efforts to privatize, democratize, and modernize the sector. Adequate future GOP funding for O&M and for computer and irrigation equipment needs is by no means assured, while water user associations need more power so they can levy taxes themselves and be less dependent on the Pakistani bureaucracy.
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USAID DEC