Retrospective study of basic education and skills training (BEST) : USAID assistance to sector reform in Zimbabwe

Several things set BEST apart from the normal USAID project of that era. (1) BEST was one of the first USAID programs to use the Commodity Import Program (CIP) mechanism to provide education sector support, and one of the first to combine CIP-generated local currency and foreign exchange for this purpose. (2) BEST was a forerunner of the nonproject assistance (NAP) approach to development finance, insofar as USAID supported Zimbabwe's policies and judged it to have well-formulated plans and the management capacity to carry out the program. (3) The degree to which the BEST Working Group, rather than USAID or other contractors, made the decisions, was unusual for USAID programs at the time or since. Zimbabwe's need for fast, flexible programming of resources required USAID to work constructively within a policy environment and sensitively within local decisionmaking processes. (4) BEST's facilitative rather than directive approach empowered Zimbabwe's decisionmakers and contributed to democratization in Zimbabwe. USAID staff is remembered by nearly all those associated with the project for their insistence on documenting decisions and for their helpful, collegial manner. Though some thought USAID made things unnecessarily difficult by not telling them what it was willing to support, they ultimately felt that the experience strengthened their own work habits. (5) The BEST Working Group was the key instrument in project development and in the approval process. It made decisions regarding allocation of funds, applied criteria for project approval, and enforced requirements for proposals. Moreover, BEST projects used Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) standards, not USAID's sometimes more demanding standards. Factors critical to project success included: the favorable policy context of post-independence Zimbabwe; program coordination across GOZ ministries (also a limiting factor); substantial USAID and GOZ financing; and significant support of long-term training and staff development over the course of a decade. Factors limiting success included: lack of a mechanism for ongoing government or external funding of activities such as research, periodic reassessments, and external demand studies; erosion of the innovative climate as Zimbabwe's planning and management grew progressively more prudent; a slower than expected economic growth and consequent job creation; and lack of USAID follow-on assistance. USAID brought BEST support to an end on an "out is out" basis without a follow-on strategy or complementary program. Most other donors phased out or reduced education sector assistance in Zimbabwe at about the same time. BEST differed from general policy and strategy guidance in several ways. (1) Despite its commitment to universal basic education, the GOZ focused mainly on secondary education; few BEST resources were actually spent on the primary level. (2) BEST's building assistance, including non-instructional infrastructure such as offices and university dormitories, and its funding for commodities, including instructional materials and toolkits, was in many ways critical to program success. Most of these expenditures were made in CIP-generated local currency, despite the general guidance that assistance for such end uses be limited and that hard currency inputs be used to leverage local currency budgetary commitments. (3) Rather than reduce fees and increase subsidies to improve equity, the GOZ reduced subsidies and increased cost recovery to make it feasible to expand rapidly. It relied extensively on communities to build and maintain schools, used school fees at all levels, required tuition at tertiary levels, offered student loans, and looked to employers to fund much of the technical training. (4) The GOZ has sustained the extraordinarily ambitious reforms supported by BEST for more than a decade and shows every sign of continuing to make education a priority. Contrary to customary international recommendations, Zimbabwe's experience is that policy-driven reforms taken as political imperatives can force administrative, budgetary, policy, and technical reforms and reallocations that may not have been possible or advisable using conventional planning approaches. Includes suggestions for follow-up and further discussion.