USAID/Guatemala stocktaking of 1986-1991 administration of justice program

began to try to improve Guatemala"s judicial sector in 1986 with regional activities. Its first bilateral effort was a cooperative agreement with the Center for Criminal Justice of Harvard Law School (HLS), which began in 7/87. A second project -- Improved Administration of Justice (5200369) -- began in 9/88. By mid 1991 the HLS effort was over and Project 5200369 was limping along with no promise of real accomplishments (it was allowed to quietly expire at the end of 1991). This paper serves as an informal in-house evaluation of 5200369 and a discussion paper leading to possible new projects. Key findings and lessons follow. (1) Guatemala"s Judicial Branch (JB) for the most part has not attempted to implement reforms supported by the USAID projects, nor has it demonstrated serious interest in administrative improvements. There is a widespread lack of public faith in the JB. (2) The prosecutorial function continues to be overwhelmingly ineffective. (3) The objective of increasing access to the judicial system has not been met. (4) While support to CENALEX -- the JB"s National Legislative Center -- has been relatively successful, the Center will wither and die if it does not receive increased financial support. (5) The long delay in starting up project 5200369 probably lessened everyone"s understanding of the project, and commitment. (6) One cannot interpret assent to documents (e.g., Pro-Ag"s, workplans) as true agreement to their terms. (7) Project 5200369 tried to start implementation on too large a scale, beyond what is now recognized as the JB"s limited absorptive capacity. (8) One cannot expect that a massive institutional reform will succeed without selling the activities to the staff of the institution involved. (9) The technique of using a Project Implementation Unit poses dangers which need to be recognized and addressed. (10) Physical separation of a TA group from its counterpart organization is undesirable. (11) Personal conflicts in project 5200369 were ignored, on the incorrect assumption that time would put them in perspective. (12) The use of A.I.D. funds and of a foreign assistance group to hire local personnel for the JB was unwise. (13) The JB was not required to provide counterpart funding, and when new staff were needed for a project activity, the JB simply did not act. Despite all of the preceding, A.I.D. assistance to improve the judicial system is well accepted, if not always well-used, and the environment for reform seems to have improved over the last few years. In any judicial assistance, primary attention must be given to human resource development. It is also noted that juvenile delinquency -- so far not subject to any USAID intervention -- is a serious and growing problem which is not receiving adequate attention. (Author abstract, modified)