Agricultural policy reform in Niger : the agriculture sector development grant

Under that agreement, the GON was to receive $29 million in local currency in return for undertaking specific agricultural policy reforms. These reforms thus became conditions precedent for the release of funds into a special account. A Secretariat was established to manage the counterpart fund, and a joint USAID/GON committee was formed to allocate the fund to support agricultural policy reforms and development projects. In addition, $3 million was included for TA, and a team of resident advisors was provided by the University of Michigan. The ASDG's results have been mixed. Policy reforms have been undertaken, although the success of these reforms has varied. The ASDG's macroeconomic impacts have been significant, though of limited magnitude. The effectiveness of the TA was also mixed. The advisors completed a number of important studies, but Nigerien participation in those studies was minimal. Little progress was made in enhancing the host government's capability to undertake policy analysis, though training in microcomputer use was successful. The ASDG program's experience yields numerous lessons regarding several potential trade-offs associated with undertaking this approach to policy reform as opposed to a more traditional policy and planning project. Lessons learned are as follows: (1) The credibility and effectiveness of the program depends largely on the rigor of the process through which satisfaction of the CP's is certified. The program's credibility can be undermined in a situation such as the 1986 evaluation suggested exists in Niger, where disbursements were made even when there was some question as to whether the GON had fully met the CP's specified for that tranche; (2) Enforcement of the CP's requires a careful balance between being too strict if conditions warrant flexibility and being too flexible in certifying that CP's have been met. There must be a clearly established system of responsibility and accountability for making that certification. It appears that in the ASDG, the TA team's role in that decision was secondary to the political objectives of the Mission. The result of unjustified disbursements can be to undercut the team's effectiveness in promoting policy reform and in establishing the analytical capacity to continue the reform process. (3) The lack of integration of the economic advisors into the Ministry of Agriculture and the lack of interaction between advisors and counterparts has minimized the institution-building impacts of the ASDG and reduced the likelihood of the reform process continuing after the program's completion. (4) Government announcements that a particular policy has been reformed (such as the liberalization of cowpea exports in Niger) may make little differences if administrative and other barriers are not removed in the process. (5) Programs should serve to strengthen the ties between policy analysis and decisionmaking. Reforms are more likely to be implemented if decisionmakers appreciate the importance of analysis and understand the rationale and objectives of proposed reforms. (Author abstract, modified)