Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II

(IRD) to provide assistance to Afghan civilian war victims. The program was established in 2002 to assist Afghan civilians who suffered losses in confrontations between international military forces and Taliban insurgents. The primary objective of the program was to provide victims with appropriate and timely assistance to recover and rebuild their lives. The program provided nonmonetary immediate assistance such as foodstuffs, small household items, and repairs to damaged homes and other properties. Tailored assistance included grants to start small businesses such as clothes shops, grocery stores, and livestock farming with cows and sheep. As of September 30, 2013, USAID/Afghanistan's financial records showed that the program had obligated $39.8 million and spent approximately $28.9 million. The program database showed that assistance had reached beneficiaries throughout Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) confirmed 592 incidents involving international military forces and insurgents between September 2011 and September 2013 in which Afghan civilians suffered losses. The program provided immediate and tailored assistance to approximately 5,488 Afghan civilian families, for approximately $9.3 million. Additionally, the program awarded 465 grants in tailored assistance for approximately $5.4 million to 1,339 Afghan civilian families who had also received immediate assistance. IRD established two indicators to determine the impact of the program on the lives of Afghan civilians who received assistance. However, determining the percentage increases over the course of the program required initial measures or baselines that were not available. To establish the baselines, IRD launched a survey of 16 Afghan provinces in October 2012. A preliminary report dated July 23, 2013, showed results for 11 provinces: 62 percent for the first indicator and 45 percent for the second. The audit team collected firsthand information from beneficiaries. On October 23, 2013, the audit team observed distribution of immediate assistance provided to ten Afghan civilian families in Kabul. According to male family members accepting the assistance on behalf of the families, immediate assistance in the form of foodstuffs helped them prepare for funerals and sustain those whose breadwinners had suffered injuries. On December 3, 2013, the audit team met with ten other family representatives at a secured location in Herat. All said they had received immediate assistance, for which they expressed gratitude to America, and some were awaiting tailored assistance. The audit identified several program weaknesses, including the failure to provide timely assistance or adequate verification of beneficiaries. The program required delivery of immediate assistance within 2 to 7 days, but IRD took an average of 50 and 28 days, respectively, for the first and second years of the program. Additionally, the program's procedures for verifying beneficiaries were weak, which could have allowed assistance to go to beneficiaries who were not genuine. IRD also failed to follow USAID's strategy to coordinate with other organizations. The strategy called on IRD to refer beneficiaries to a network of more than 100 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and to coordinate with other donor organizations, other USAID programs, ISAF, and the Government of Afghanistan to provide a range of services that would help the beneficiaries to rebuild their lives and livelihoods and establish enduring relationships between beneficiaries and local organizations. Instead, IRD implemented the program using its own staff, made referrals to only five NGOs, another USAID program, and the Government of Afghanistan for medical supply distributions.