End of project review : USAID Sudan energy planning and management project no. 650-0059 (1983-1989)

The project was a relative success. The NEA's capability to conduct energy analyses in a wide range of areas has been considerably improved. The inadequate attention to skills transfer (especially in the areas of financial and economic analysis) identified in the mid-term evaluation appears to have been satisfactorily corrected by increased emphasis on short-term and on-the-job training, as well as by M.S. training for nearly all NEA section or division heads through the Conventional Energy Training Program (CETP). Mathematical modeling tools provided by the project are being productively used except for the comprehensive integrated energy planning accounting system (RES- SUDAN), which NEA staff need but do not feel knowledgeable enough to use. Some of the NEA's current activities include work on an updated national energy plan, evaluations of renewable energy options such as gasification and briquetting, and publication of The Sudan Energy News. NEA is also increasing its involvement with other donor organizations. Efforts at the NEC focused on upgrading its computer center as the centerpiece for the reform of its financial system; these efforts were very successful. The computerized billing system, which has been operating for the past 1-2 years, has shown substantial payoffs; by FY 1987-88, NEC revenues were more than 3 times the level of FY 1984-1985. Other major accomplishments include the provision of substantial amounts of formal long- and short-term training to NEC technicians, and development of a small but capable core group within middle and upper technical management. BNG system reliability (i.e., levels of electrical shortages, outages, system failures, etc.), while greatly improved, was highly uneven and remains vulnerable to social and political turmoil. While the higher goals of institution building are fundamentally sound and have been substantially met, many of the project's near-term goals were unrealistically ambitious given the developmental challenges represented by the NEA and NEC and Sudan's economic and social instability. Of the near term goals -- higher GNP in energy sensitive sectors, more efficient energy use, a capability to provide advice on optimal energy policies (NEA), improved organization and management structure, and a 60% improvement in revenue collection (NEC), only the last was fully achieved (and was in fact substantially exceeded). Furthermore, institutional goals such as promoting NEA as the central policy player in the energy sector invoke considerable resistance from entrenched interests, though this should not overshadow the importance of developing stronger energy sector institutions in the Sudan. A major lesson learned is that except under the most favorable circumstances, even long and expensive projects cannot entirely build a counterpart organization.