Evaluation of business development services program - Argentina and fast track program - Uruguay

businesses. Final evaluation covers the period 4/93-4/95. Direct bilateral assistance to both countries will be terminated by the end of FY 1995. Overall, the programs failed to reach their objectives. Both programs were funded both by USAID/W and by their respective mission, and major differences of opinion between the USAID managers of these funding sources as to project approach and deployment of human resources resulted in substantial conflicts regarding program structure, management, and staffing, and had a material effect on the progress of the projects. No joint ventures were completed and there were little, if any, positive results. A number of lessons were learned. (1) BDS programs should not be undertaken unless there is at least one experienced full-time person in-country who is accountable to IESC. (2) If different parts of USAID provide funding for different parts of the BDS program, the USAID executives must reach agreement on how best to allocate resources in order to optimize program performance. (3) Since sector selection is the first step in the BDS process, IESC should never relegate this activity to a Chamber of Commerce (as it did in Uruguay), USAID, or anyone else; IESC should play the leadership role. (4) Given the complex and continuously iterative nature of joint venture formation, BDS projects should be programmed for not less than 3-5 years. (5) Because of their lack of familiarity with external markets, most small and medium companies in both developing countries and advanced developing countries (ADCs) are poorly equipped to visualize the range of possibilities that could be generated through collaboration with a U.S. company; the Volunteer Executive is the key to solving this problem. (6) A standard schedule of graduated fees, plus a "success fee", should be adopted for all ADC programs. (7) IESC should rethink its concept of presenting one company at a time to host-country prospective partners. (8) BDS programs must have objectives that are clear, understood, and accepted by all players. (9) IESC should continue to be flexible regarding its in-country arrangements, modifying its "Chamber of Commerce" model whenever this seems most appropriate to the particular country involved. (10) The BDS program should avoid raising unreasonable expectations of results among clients and donors alike. (11) IESC should develop and budget for significantly increased communications with its host country clients. (12) Lawful exports to the United States should not automatically be ruled out as a target market for BDS-generated joint ventures.