Evaluation of US Government response to 1991/92 Southern Africa drought -- country report : Zambia

The severity of the drought and the magnitude of the food gap, combined with the new government's limited resources, could have led to widespread famine and economic catastrophe, but this did not occur and a great deal of the credit is due to USAID for its creativity and leadership in helping the Zambian government to manage the crisis. The operation was an impressive example of coordination among USAID, the Republic of Zambia, donors, the UN, NGOs, and neighboring governments. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities, along with frequent coordination meetings, enabled a unified and well executed relief force. Task forces and special committees were effective mechanisms with which to organize resources. The government's commitment protected relief operations from political interference. Among the key findings of this evaluation are the following. (1) Early warning systems worked. (2) The response was executed in a timely manner and without interruption of food supplies -- generally before debilitating nutritional consequences occurred. (3) USAID/Z used two creative, cost-saving mechanisms to pool donor resources -- first, to permit maize transport on less expensive non-U.S. ships, and second, to pool donor resources for purchase of U.S. commercial maize. (4) The strategy to support the market system was effective in providing sufficient food while preventing disruption of structural adjustment activities. (5) Food forwork (FFW) was an effective and appropriate self-targeting mechanism which ensured that food relief went to those who needed it. (6) NGOs were effective in delivering targeted emergency food. The use of an overall coordinating organization helped inexperienced NGOS to quickly develop effective operations. (7) Initial food needs assessments were not accurate, leaving considerable foreign food left over at the end. (8) The supplementary feeding and health delivery system was not sufficient. As the need for such supplemental feeding increased, supplies did not -- malnutrition rates for women and children in the supplemental feeding system reached 48%, with severe malnutrition reaching 15%. The following lessons were learned. (1) At the onset of a disaster, donors and aid agencies should define a clear focal point for emergency response. The structure should work collaboratively between donors and government and allow quick financial and operational decisions. (2) Emergency food assessments must acknowledge and integrate socioeconomic and structural factors and account for behavioral shifts during emergencies so that the proper amounts of resources are allocated. (3) Emergency services should be phased out with care. Commercial assistance should not become a disincentive to local production or depress prices for post-drought harvests. (4) While FFW can be an effective targeting mechanism, it is difficult to create well-designed labor-intensive development projects in emergency situations. Preference should be given to completing existing projects rather than creating new ones, and care should be taken to ensure that sufficient resources for completing the projects are available.