Evaluation of US Government response to 1991/92 Southern Africa drought -- country report : Mozambique

assistance to Mozambique during the 1991-92 drought in southern Africa. The drought exacerbated emergency conditions that Mozambique had been confronting for decades due to war and poor economic management. Because the public and private institutions, the infrastructure, and the private sector economy were ill prepared to handle the compounded crisis, the international community assumed a dominant role in its mitigation under the leadership of USAID/Mozambique, which provided most of the resources and coordinated the relief effort. International NGOs played an especially significant role in the distribution of the relief goods, accounting for the distribution of approximately 30% of food in the most severely drought-affected provinces. At least 23 national and international NGOs participated in free food aid distribution, nutritional rehabilitation, health programs, water drought-related projects, local purchases of food, and logistical support. Significantly and atypically, Mozambique relied on private transport for the transport of emergency supplies. The drought response was greatly facilitated by past donor interventions, especially those of USAID, in the areas of policy reform, deregulation, and infrastructure development. The overriding strategic lessons learned from the Mozambique experience are that it is possible to (1) mitigate potential disaster in the face of weak governmental structures by mobilizing civil society organizations such as NGOs, and (2) make otherwise politically unpopular but needed changes in a developing country by using the emergency as a justification: the impact of the drought led the conflicting sides to sign the Rome Peace Accord, which suddenly opened all of Mozambique, except the mined areas, to the relief effort. The primary constraint to the provision of relief commodities became transport capacity on the ground. More specific lessons are as follows. (1) Reliance on diverse organizations and approaches for food distribution and emergency response is an appropriate option in crisis situations. The Mozambique case demonstrated that there is no need for a grand centralized implementation strategy and institutional monopolies. (2) The macroeconomic policy framework and the economic and political context, including physical infrastructure, determine the ability of an emergency response to contribute not just to saving lives but to future sustainable development. (3) Need assessments should be done by independent firms, NGOs, and universities, not the public agencies that deal with emergency assistance and tend to overestimate food shortages. (4) The high levels of relief food sold in markets throughout the country indicates a substantial leakage of food aid. Emergency food and commercial aid in Mozambique are closely interrelated, as much of the emergency aid finds its way into the food market. This problem is not as grave as the proportions of diverted food indicate. Much of the food finds its way to the population through commercial channels, albeit at a price not intended to be paid by the poor. (5) Emergency assistance should contribute to long-term food security and not be an isolated act of food distribution. (Author abstract, modified)