Evaluation of USAID/El Salvador's public services improvement project (519-0320)

Evaluation covers the period 8/89-3/95 and consists of a final evaluation of all project components except for certain water supply and sanitation (WS&S) activities still being implemented by PVOs/NGOs and communities. Aside from high-priority public services restoration activities (Component 1), the project got off to a slow start due to guerrilla activity and various logistic and management problems. Component 1 restored critical public services in accessible areas wherever they were interrupted by the war and helped to preserve the national economy and livelihood of those working in the industrial and commercial sectors. Continued availability of these services generated an economic climate that attracted foreign investment even before the Peace Accords. Components 2 and 5 (road reconstruction) rehabilitated over 1,200 km of rural roads. While this was somewhat under target, it clearly had a significant impact in rural areas, especially in the extremely depressed ex-conflictive zones, where a third of the reconstruction took place. Roads previously impassable or closed are now open and buses are running. Component 4 strengthened the institutional capability of the Directorate General of Roads (DGC) to manage a sizable program of road rehabilitation and maintenance in rural areas. It also strengthened the management ability of the Machinery and Equipment Administration (AME), which is now effectively servicing the vehicles and heavy equipment of the Roads and Urbanization Directorates. WS&S activities implemented through the National Water and Wastewater Authority (ANDA) under Component 3 were hampered by a poor initial design, ANDA's lack of experience in rural areas, lack of cooperation from a Salvadoran water supply agency that was excluded from the project, poor USAID organization, and strained USAID-ANDA relations due to inappropriate actions by some USAID and one TA personnel, host country contracting problems, and USAID policy shifts. Nonetheless, this component gave 100,000 rural residents initial or renewed access to an adequate supply of potable water, achieved important success in the community acceptance of composting latrines, and strengthened community participation (especially that of women) in WS&S planning and implementation. There is also anecdotal evidence of improvements in child and family health. However, the problems noted above and the notable shortfall in meeting quantitative targets led USAID to turn WS&S activities over to three U.S. PVOs/NGOs and the municipalities and to extend the component until 9/96, by which time an additional 171,400 beneficiaries are expected. The project's impact on employment generation has been significant, estimated at 18,300 person-years of direct employment, and 40,000 person-years of indirect employment. The project also highlighted the need for change in public service agencies, especially those responsible for WS&S and road services in rural areas and municipalities. The following lessons were learned. (1) The more complicated the implementation arrangements (e.g., as in the WS&S component), the higher the risk of implementation failure. (2) Project Implementation Orders for services or commodities that are critical to initiating implementation should be issued immediately following the signing of a Project Agreement. (3) Large and complex projects, especially those with serious implementation problems, require strong management. (4) Training of special units to assist in project implementation can impede institutional improvement, as those trained seek better employment after the project ends. (5) The case of ANDA in this project shows the possibility of USAID influencing the head of a host country agency to agree to a project which the agency itself cannot handle or is not truly interested in doing. (6) A project to maintain basic infrastructure may be a critical need during a civil war in order to avoid economic collapse. Also, having such a project in place at the end of a war may accelerate reconstruction. (7) WS&S infrastructure construction projects in rural areas will not have the desired health impact or be sustainable unless there is organized community participation and meaningful health promotion activities preceding, during, and after the construction period. Health education to encourage the proper use of new WS&S facilities is rarely effective unless monitored and supported by local groups. (8) The possibility of unauthorized use, at least from USAID's standpoint, of project-funded vehicles commonly exists in USAID projects. (9) Commodity end-use rules need to be re-examined and revised so that they are not an encumbrance to implementation.