Evaluation report on the refugee self-reliance project

Interim evaluation covers 12/82-11/85. The project has achieved only modest success - fewer subprojects (SP's) than planned have been undertaken, and economic benefits to refugees have been limited by drought and by delays in SP's. The number of targeted beneficiaries has been approached for some activities, however, and the project has had great utility as a groundwork for future planning. Improved relationships with PVO's, training of a significant number of Somalis in development management, and increased policy dialogue with the Somali government (GSDR) are also among its accomplishments. SP's in agriculture, skills training, and infrastructure were undertaken in and around refugee camps by four PVO's: Experiment in International Living, Save the Children Federation, New Transcentury Foundation, and Partnership for Productivity. Agricultural activities are on a smaller scale than planned in both rainfed and irrigated land. Seeds, tools, and tractor services have been provided, but a system of refugee cost-sharing has not yet been instituted. One SP trained five extensionists, and there has been intensive work with refugees in horticulture. The one SP involving irrigation is unlikely to meet its targets due to problems with internal management, subcontractor work, procurement, and unresolved land tenure issues. Training has focused on agricultural, commercial management, and project management skills. Future training in productive skills will need to be accompanied by some sort of access to capital so businesses can be started. In infrastructure, refugee wage labor has been used to upgrade roads, and work involving water structures is planned. These efforts should be continued, but more emphasis should be put on training refugees in productive skills that will transfer to a non-camp environment. Institutional support to GSDR's National Commission for Refugees (NCR) has had only limited success, and project-supported socioeconomic and technical studies of refugee programs have been little used. Lastly, the project has been much more management intensive than expected; this has drawn resources from field operations. Among the lessons learned are: the subgrant mechanism is appropriate where flexibility is important, but requires much management effort; joint SP funding needs to be better planned and coordinated so as to avoid delays in the whole project resulting from one donor's problems; relief efforts do not necessarily build self-reliance; and long-term goals should be based on refugee input and support the refugees' own initiatives. A 1-year extension is recommended.