DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC. (DAI) TECHNICAL SERVICES DIV.
Final evaluation of a project to increase rural income in Honduras by introducing improved technologies to rural households, enterprises, and small farms.
Arcia, Gustavo|Jones, James · 1988

Abstract
External evaluation covers the period 1979-88. By reaching 21,044 families and 447 small rural industries, the project far outstripped goals (revised in 1984) to assist 12,000 families and 110 businesses. The project also reached intended target groups, including women, Protestants and Catholics, mestizos, and blacks. Working with about 191 types of technologies and techniques, the project carried out 28,753 disseminations - 70% more than the 17,000 targeted. The most successful technologies were veterinary services, domestic stoves, soil and water conservation techniques, metal silos, corn shellers, and innovations in cropping systems and cultivars. The cost-benefit ratio of 1.39 for these technologies indicates that the project has been an economic success. In addition, many of the technologies combated the frightening pace of deforestation in Honduras. Much of the project's impact from 1986 forward can be attributed to its adoption in 1984 of the farming systems research approach, which incorporates beneficiaries into the technology generation and extension process. The project's attachment to a semiautonomous institution (the Ministry of Economy's Centro de Desarrollo Industrial) provided only limited shelter from disruptive political interventions. Management was often subjected to political pressures - either to replace competent technical staff with the politically favored or to ignore malfeasance among politically connected subordinates. The job insecurity and stress associated with this political milieu resulted in high staff turnover, including 7 project managers in 9 years. Although the credit component was positive in terms of the number of persons served, it was also very expensive, comprising 32% of the operating budget in 1987 and 1988. Furthermore, a significant number of loans delivered directly by the project were made to finance supplies for both agricultural production and small enterprises, which was clearly inappropriate for a technology dissemination project. The project also used nongovernmental organizations and private banks as financial intermediaries. NGO performance was mixed. Of the 10 NGO participants, 7 currently have active loan agreements, while default and administrative problems forced the project to renegotiate the debt with 2 and initiate legal proceedings against the third. Although the total number of loans through private banks was quite small, results are encouraging since loans from such banks to small farmers are usually considered too small and risky to be profitable.
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Classification
USAID DEC