Final evaluation of USAID/DR strengthening civil society activity

Thanks in part to this activity, the 1996 presidential elections (unlike the previous elections in 1994) were widely considered to be fair and transparent. Dominican civil society came out in full force to ensure that Joaquin Balaguer kept his promise to leave the Presidency in 1996. The activity was implemented by four actors. Partipacion Ciudadana (PC) did an outstanding job of recruiting and training some 5,000 Dominicans, over half under age 24, as election observers, who performed superlatively on May 16 and June 30 and in administering a parallel quick count of votes. PC overcame the apprehensions of the Electoral Council (JCE) and key political parties, which felt that PC's perceived affiliation with the opposition PRD party would lead to bias. The Grupo de Accion por la Democracia (GAD) used its clout to assure that elections took place in 1996 and to help select and support what was widely seen as a highly credible JCE. It also carried out a highly participatory activity leading to the development of a National Agenda that was endorsed by the three main political parties, and made a strong start at organizing local Action Groups. GAD's effectiveness in carrying out mass media and other civic education campaigns to stimulate the Dominican populace to vote was less clear. The Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos/Centro para Asesoria Electoral (IIDH/CAPEL) provided invaluable assistance in helping PC develop election materials, train election observers, and prepare for and carry out the quick count. IIDH/CAPEL organized an 8/95 seminar that linked up key actors (GAD, PC, JCE) and kicked off civil society's participation in the elections, and its flexibility enabled it to reprogram $90,000 in grant funds marked for PC to cover elections monitoring expenses when PC exceeded its budget. GAD was not interested in IIDH/CAPEL's assistance. USAID/DR received high marks for its collaborative and participatory approach. The Mission identified and linked up civil society groups with common interests; brokered the design of a comprehensive program of civil society support for a free and fair election in 1996; brought in IIDH/CAPEL to serve as a neutral bridge between PC and GAD on the one hand and the JCE on the other; played a proactive role behind the scenes in advising PC regarding elections monitoring and the quick count; and provided flexible financing that enabled both PC and GAD to respond quickly to unanticipated situations. In sum, the activity made an unequivocal difference in the 1996 elections. Knowledge that the U.S. government was closely watching the election with intended neutrality undoubtedly influenced Balaguer's and the political parties' commitment to keep the election on track. Financial support for PC made the JCE more effective; the polling stations and political parties knew they were being watched on election days. The quick count, which provided data within .026 of the official returns, gave the latter a great deal of credibility. USAID served as a catalyst in the formation of GAD, and it helped to recruit and train those managing the electoral tables. The following lessons were learned. (1) That USAID took a very participatory and collaborative approach was highly effective. Both the USAID Mission Director and the U.S. Ambassador were lauded by their Dominican partners for letting them take the lead and relating to them with deference and respect. (2) To create the flexibility needed for this activity, USAID included broad objectives and illustrative activities under each grant component, rather than setting specific targets. This allowed USAID, on numerous occasions, to jump in and provide urgently needed assistance. (3) The importance of having political parties and government authorities under surveillance during the electoral process cannot be overemphasized. Throughout the 20-month period, from the signing of the Pact for Democracy in 8/94 to the second elections round in 6/96, both entities were under the constant scrutiny of Dominican civil society, the U.S. Government, and the international press. (4) Given the circumstances surrounding the 1994 elections, USAID would not have been permitted to bring in a U.S. TA provider even if it wanted to. Instead, USAID arranged to bring in a Latin American TA provider, IIDH/CAPEL, that had developed a relationship with and the trust of the JCE. This outside TA was critical, especially to PC.