Final evaluation : Zimbabwe grain marketing reform support program (613-0233) and the grain marketing reform research project (613-0234)

Under Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), grain marketing was transformed from 1991 to 1997 from a highly centralized and protected system to a privately-oriented, unsubsidized, and decentralized system. The change has been momentous -- private transport of maize is permitted anywhere in the country, the Grain Marketing Board's (GMB) share of domestic maize sales has fallen from 100% to 10%, and the vast majority of the maize marketed in rural Zimbabwe is no longer milled at large, central mills, but at small hammermills, virtually all of which have come into existence since 1990. GMRSP and GMRRP played a substantial role in these reforms, speeding their pace well beyond what had been expected, given the worst drought of the century in 1991/92, another severe drought in 1994/5, and excessive rainfall and crop damage in 1996/7. The major impact of USAID's support for grain marketing reform has been increased food availability in the rural areas and reduced prices for subsistence foods in both rural and urban areas. The impact on household food security is less clear. Inadequate market information has emerged as a major constraint to further improvements in this area. There is need to totally sever the increasingly commercialized activities of the GMB from the residual public sector functions it is still called on to perform -- most notably the management of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR). Whether or not the new decentralized system will be robust enough to provide the food needed without reversion to increased government controls will be demonstrated with the next severe drought and food production shortfalls. The success of USAID support is attributable to excellent pre-project preparation, an early decision to tackle a set of problems of national importance to Zimbabwe, an extremely well-designed program/project combination, and an exemplary willingness on the part of key Zimbabwean government officials to move toward market liberalization in the face of deep-seated concerns and overt criticisms. USAID decided not to release the fourth tranche and to deobligate funds committed for studies and monitoring because the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) did not meet the conditionality for release. The circumstances surrounding this decision would make an extremely useful, if not classic, case study of conflicting objectives within the Agency: the flexibility and patience at the country program level to achieve an original set of objectives versus the bureaucratic culture at the USAID/Washington level, which, having made global changes in goals, objectives, and procedures, requires all ongoing programs to either conform or be phased out as soon as practicable. Among the more noteworthy lessons are the following. (1) The use of nonproject assistance as the tool of choice was critically important to the success of the grain market reform effort. (2) Significant policy reforms in food marketing need to be supported over the long-term, especially in a country as food-insecure as is Zimbabwe. Not to stay the course for as long as is necessary to institutionalize successes invites subsequent backsliding, especially during times of stress on the food systems. (3) Impact on rural households in a country with infrastructure as poor as Zimbabwe's takes a long time to be felt. Monitoring these impacts over the longest possible time period is essential. Since most USAID projects are of relatively short duration, this monitoring needs to be institutionalized within the recipient country so that it can be sustained after the USAID assistance is completed.