Haiti demobilization and reintegration program : an evaluation prepared for US Agency for International Development

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) implemented the program. The IOM staff had the political sensitivity, experience, knowledge, and person-to-person skills needed to implement the program, and generally performed well. Some 88% of the estimated 6,250 demobilized soldiers registered with IOM, and all but a few hundred of these accepted the 6-month vocational training course that IOM offered. Good USAID-IOM coordination led to a timely startup, as well as flexibility in implementation, although the program's controversial nature made it difficult for IOM to coordinate with high-level Haitian officials and forge links with other aid programs. The IOM training program was high-quality, provided soldiers timely entrance to courses, provided the types of training requested, and increased the capacity of existing schools. Of the more than 4,800 graduates of the training program, over 4,500 participated in IOM's Opportunity and Referral Service (ORS), which offered training in job search skills, employment referrals, and vocational tool kits. Unfortunately, only 304 graduates obtained employment through the ORS. Promoting social reconciliation also proved difficult. Despite several efforts, IOM was unable to introduce civic education into the program (the FAd'H continued to view themselves as "entitled" victims of an unjust dismissal). There were also no systematic attempts by IOM to promote the efforts of some schools to foster local reconciliation through local projects, although IOM tried to support such programming. The demobilization program had a significant impact in several areas. (1) By holding out the promise of aid and engaging the former FAd'H in the short term (6 months), the demobilization program probably helped to protect the U.S. military force, and contributed to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. (2) By continuing over 2 years as more soldiers were demobilized, the program probably helped to lessen threats from the former FAd'H, which, in turn, provided a breathing space to enable other security, political, economic, and social transition activities to occur. However, other factors also contributed to this breathing space, including the UN presence and the threat of vigilantism. Moreover, the unexpected complete demobilization of the FAd'H (which had also served as a police force) left Haiti without police. Building a new police force that could contain potential FAd'H threats proved difficult and time-consuming. (3) Although the demobilization program gave the former FAd'H some of the skills required for employment, full reintegration is not occurring due to poor economic conditions in Haiti, lower-than-expected economic growth, and the stigma of being a former soldier. The Haiti experience teaches the need for flexibility, extensive coordination with inter-connected transition activities, keeping the demobilized soldiers occupied so that they cause no trouble, and, what is most difficult of all, promoting reconciliation between former soldiers and society, possibly by embedding demobilization programs in efforts to aid the local community. The Haiti experience also demonstrates that demobilization programs are appropriate USAID/OTI projects because -- depending on their outcome -- they may help maintain the momentum of a transition by assisting peacekeeping forces, providing a breathing space to enable other transition activities to occur, and reintegrating former soldiers into society. (Author abstract, modified)