Near East Bureau regional private enterprise development project : evaluation report

In any case, it has been a generally flawed program, lacking focus and the concentration needed for producing directly attributable impact on private sector development in the countries assisted, alternately, by the Near East Bureau, the Asia and Near East Bureau, the Europe and Near East Bureau and, after they split, the Near East Bureau again. This evaluation includes tables and charts covering the various functional and geographic emphases of the program, then an analysis of the five priority programming areas (trade and investment, financial markets, private sector support, training and business exchange, and privatization). This is followed by an analysis by country and region, and analysis of program organization and administration, and a set of analytical reviews of 37 illustrative subprojects. PEDP"s purpose, goals, and objectives have been too grandiose for the way the program has been structured and operated. Even its acknowledged advantages of flexibility and timeliness of response have been blunted by inadequate staffing and inconsistent supervision and management. In many respects, much of the PEDP"s value has been in assisting AID in overcoming its own structural and procedural inadequacies. Seen from a more broad Bureau managerial perspective, the PEDP was useful in providing the Regional Bureau with a flexible proactive programming arm with which to stimulate and implement innovative activities and promote top level Agency policy initiatives. Of the PEDP"s 101 subprojects, a number were well designed and professionally implemented. However, their impact and effectiveness cannot be measured with any certainty, mainly because no recognizable systems for project evaluation, reporting, monitoring, and follow-up were ever put into operation on a consistent basis. Moreover, at the Mission level, the PEDP was plagued by the Agency-wide malaise of a lack of institutional memory. On another plane, the degree to which host country governments and, especially, local private sector leaders and institutions, were involved in the design and implementation of the overall program and individual subprojects -- a sine qua non for truly effective private sector development projects -- is not readily apparent from available documentation. The program has been gradually transformed by USAID policy makers over the eight years of its life from an initial concern with host country priorities to more concern for U.S. commercial interests and comparative advantages and, finally, from essentially a program of assistance to Missions" programs for private sector development to greater emphasis on Regional Bureau-perceived optimal economic development strategies, plans, objectives, and initiatives. PEDP subprojects were frequently funded jointly by Mission funds and, more particularly, major Central Bureau-sponsored programs. Not infrequently, the PEDP effort and subprojects have been peripheral in relation to the efforts of larger, more focused, and better financed programs and, on occasion, not in consonance with Mission or country programming priorities. The following lessons were learned: (1) Programs with a multiplicity of participating institutions and contractors cannot function effectively with inadequate in-house staffing and organization. Good supervision is needed to ensure optimal use of public funds. (2) Too much was asked of the PEDP, which was actually more of a funding mechanism than a development-oriented program. (3) Scattered efforts are hard to manage and harder to guide. (4) Without enthusiastic Mission support and participation, subprojects" potential for success will be diminished. The major recommendations include continuation of the program (but only after thorough restructuring and reform), and changes for improved management, and greater focus. (Author abstract, modified)