Regional transport and storage development, phase II Kafue-Chirundu Road

Mid-term evaluation covers the period 1981-11/87 and is based on document review, interviews, and site visits. The first contractor, Whyle & Co. (W&C), was fired in early 1986 by the Government of Zambia (GOZ) for its inability to perform the road work and replaced in 1/87 by Lendor & Burton. The quality of the latter's work is good, as is supervision by an engineer from Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy & Stratton (TAMS). The GOZ has exceeded its financial commitment to the SP, which has more than adequate funds. Chances are good that the SP will be successfully completed by 10/88. While Phase I resealing has held up well (and incidentally, represents an excellent cost saving achieved by A.I.D.), as has Phase II construction by W&C, heavy overstressing of the road due to excessive axle loads renders long-term maintenance doubtful. The GOZ should revise its maintenance plan to address this problem and determine whether excess SP funds will be needed for maintenance; it should also locate the maintenance equipment supplied by A.I.D. for exclusive use on the road. SP management by A.I.D. and the GOZ, ineffectual early in Phase II, has improved greatly, but there is a need for the GOZ Director of Roads to become more personally involved in SP management. Also, while the USAID/Z project officer, helped (intermittently) by the regional office in Harare, is providing good oversight, both should visit the SP site regularly and report on their findings. Other needs are to have the GOZ clarify TAMS' authority; gather baseline and follow-up data; and resolve claims pending from the work of W&C. Several lessons were learned. (1) Many problems were caused by neglect of A.I.D.'s regulation forbidding invitations for bids to be issued on construction contracts before the preparation of technical specifications, drawings, and other key documents. (2) There is no substitute for designing and budgeting for assessments and evaluations throughout a project's life. A formal evaluation (including budget analysis), if conducted before 1/85, would have shown W&C's shortcomings and the adequacy of funds to hire a new contractor. (3) Even with host country contracting, road construction projects require effective, timely A.I.D. oversight. Early on, neither the GOZ nor A.I.D. heeded TAMS's criticisms of W&C - a problem compounded by A.I.D.'s 1985 decision to shift the engineer position at USAID/Z to the regional office in Zimbabwe. No formal understanding between USAID/Z and the regional office regarding SP management occurred until 5/87. A PES faceseet listing USAID/Z action decisions is included.