Risk, rule, and reason in Africa

Authoritarian political traditions, lack of national identity, underdeveloped middle classes, and widespread economic distress are among the sweeping, impersonal forces cited as factors that produce poor leader after poor leader in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper instead takes a micro- level view of leadership. Without denying that macro-level social and economic factors bear on leaders" behavior, the author looks at these people as individuals and speculates about the incentives created by their environment. In the tradition of political economy, the author begins with the assumption that African leaders are usually trying to do what they think is best for themselves. He contends that they choose actions that appear to produce the greatest benefit at least cost, after making allowances for the degree of risk involved. A leader of this kind is also capable of learning, and takes cues from what is happening to other leaders in neighboring countries. He can improve his behavior if he has to. The paper speculates how leaders might react to perceived levels of risk in their political environment, looks at the actual level of risk, and then assesses how risk seems to have changed the way African leaders act in office. Finally, it looks at ways that democratization processes may be improving political incentives. Includes references. (Author abstract, modified)