The U.S. response to the African famine, 1984-1986. Vol. 1. An evaluation of the emergency food assistance program : synthesis report

Food Assistance program in Chad, Mali, and the Sudan during 1984-85. The program helped 6 million people in Sudan, 2 million in Mali, and over a million in Chad cope with the worst food crisis of written record. The program succeeded by identifying food distribution channels - especially PVO's and the private sector (coordination with other donors helped in Mali and Chad only) - and by utilizing all distribution modes, including specialized feeding programs (which allowed targeted beneficiaries to be reached regularly), monetization (a key component in all 3 countries), and general distribution (effective when well-monitored). Also, the traditional coping mechanisms (e.g., sharing, use of famine foods) of the affected populations served greatly to extend the distribution of emergency foods. Program effectiveness was enhanced by the use of socioeconomic and nutrition/health data to target needy persons and areas for supplemental feeding. This was especially evident in Chad; lack of supplemental feeding in Sudan and Mali reduced the impact on those most at risk, especially children. Packaging of resources (e.g., providing technical assistance, money, seeds, transport as well as food) also increased effectiveness, particularly for certain distribution modes such as resettlement in Chad. Although the 3 USAID's performed well, given limited staff resources, program management suffered in that it was attempted within normal development channels, and mostly by persons with little or no emergency food aid experience. There was a striking lack of preparedness - although the drought was already in its third year - on the part of USAID's, donors, and host governments; needs assessments were far off the mark, due to lack of accurate data. Also, monitoring was introduced late and focused more on adherence to procedures than on impact assessment. Development programs in the three countries were not being aimed at raising inadequate income levels - the root of both underdevelopment and food emergencies. Nor, except for resettlement efforts in Chad and minor Food for Work projects in Mali, did the program address the income problem. Included is a detailed strategy, based on lessons learned during the program, for achieving U.S. emergency food assistance objectives.