U.S. aid to Zimbabwe : an evaluation

assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) during the early 1980"s is examined in this report, focusing on a $20 million reconstruction program grant and a $2 million project grant for rebuilding rural health clinics. Major topics include the aid"s political impact, macroeconomic rationale, relief and reconstruction activities, and conclusions and lessons learned. For the most part, A.I.D. assistance was successful. The GOZ administered the programs efficiently and equitably. Roads, schools, cattle dips, government housing, and clinics were rebuilt during difficult circumstances, and seed and food relief were distributed. Additionally, through the reconstruction activities, the GOZ was able to reestablish administrative structures in rural areas from which it had been excluded by the civil war. Unfortunately, recognition that A.I.D. had contributed to the reconstruction effort was practically nonexistent in rural areas and uncertain in political circles. There was little evidence of A.I.D. oversight of the reconstruction and relief activities, because of the assumption that the cash grant mode of assistance did not require it and a lack of resident Mission staff. Moreover, some of the programs were limited in their achievements (e.g., the winter vegetable seed packet, which was too complicated and funded too late to be of much help to the farmers who received it, and the rural health clinics, which, though rapidly reconstructed, suffered from a lack of drugs, equipment, and adequate inspection by the Ministry of Health). The bureaucracy which effectively implemented the programs watched its future competence put into question by reorganization, changing personnel policies, and the uncertain tenure of white administrators with their often dated attitudes toward rural Africans. Lessons learned are as follows. (1) A.I.D. has a range of foreign assistance tools available, such as policy analysis and technical expertise. The success of the Zimbabwe program should not delude the Agency into thinking that money is all it has to offer. (2) A.I.D. can respond flexibly and quickly when political priorities are clear and sufficiently important. (3) If a high priority is given to foreign assistance as a symbol of U.S. commitment, it needs to be thought through as carefully as the development objectives. The country team should ensure that a strategy for achieving political benefits from the aid is established and its progress regularly assessed. (4) The Zimbabwe experience suggests the need for more flexible forms of assistance. Appropriate changes should be made to simplify A.I.D. procedures.