Audit of USAID"s disaster assistance to Rwanda

The Bureau for Human Response/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA), together with USAID/Rwanda and NGOs, ensured that the $34.3 million in USAID assistance was delivered to the intended beneficiaries inside Rwanda. OFDA"s initial response consisted of 400 rolls of plastic sheeting for use in providing temporary shelter to refugees, along with emergency food aid, provided through the World Food Program (WFP), to internally displaced populations, refugees and returnees, and other vulnerable groups. Later, OFDA funded grants to 7 NGOS, as follows. (1) International Action Against Hunger (AICF/USA) implemented emergency health and water programs in the Prefecture of Butare, including the repair of existing pumped and gravity-based water systems and dispensary facilities and training of health personnel. (2) African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) implemented a primary health care project for refugees, internally displaced, and war-affected persons in the Prefecture of Byumba. (3) American Refugee Committee (ARC) rehabilitated water systems and health centers in northeastern Rwanda and trained health personnel in preventive health and basic curative care. (4) International Medical Corps (IMC) implemented an emergency medical intervention project for internally displaced and returning civilian populations in the Prefectures of Kibungo and Butare, including providing technical and material support to health centers and improving the performance of health personnel. (5) The International Rescue Committee (IRC) implemented health and water rehabilitation projects in the Prefectures of Cyangugu and Kibungo. This included providing medicines and supplies and increasing the level of knowledge and skill of health care staff. (6) World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD) implemented an emergency agricultural program in the Prefectures of Gikongoro, Ruhengeri/Gishenyi, and Kanazi, which included supplying seed and tool packs, reactivating agricultural field stations, and improving the capabilities of agronomists and extension agents. (7) Catholic Relief Services (CRS) operated OFDA-funded emergency distribution programs for food and non-food items in Rwanda from 6/93 through 12/95 which provided food, blankets, soap, seeds, tools, and other essential goods necessary for the survival of up to 365,000 displaced and indigent Rwandans affected by war and genocide. The audit uncovered four problems. (1) USAID/Rwanda lacks an up-to-date Mission Disaster Response Plan (MDRP), as required by OFDA guidance, leaving the Mission ill-prepared for future emergencies, the potential for which exists both in Rwanda and nearby countries. The problem is due in part to the lack of or frequent turnover of staff, including not having a Mission Director present at all times in Kigali. (2) After the initial disaster relief effort, OFDA"s monitoring of the disaster assistance inside Rwanda was inconsistent and unguided. Oversight consisted of self-monitoring by the NGOs, as well as monitoring by two U.S. personal services contractors located at the Mission. Contractor efforts were ineffective, however, due to an absence of specific written guidance clearly emphasizing the importance of monitoring, and a lack of access to the NGOs" status reports. In one case, an NGO built a health center when it was supposed to rehabilitate an existing one. (3) Virtually none of the tools or products of the disaster assistance efforts funded by the NGO grants bore U.S. governmental markings which would have informed beneficiaries that they were receiving assistance from the American people. This occurred because Mission staff and OFDA personnel wrongly believed such identification was not required due to the emergency nature of their projects and the fact that the requirement is not contained in USAID Handbook 13. (4) While no effort was made to audit USAID"s emergency food assistance delivered through the WFP to the refugee camps located on the border outside Rwanda, there is evidence of inflated refugee counts in the camps, resulting in the delivery of excess amounts of food. Most of these camps have not been subject to a census in more than a year; a recent recount in one camp showed a 50% decrease in the refugee population since that census. There is also evidence of USAID food commodities being taken by local military units and being traded on local markets.