Bolivia drought 1983/1984 : drought assessment and evaluation of USAID food-related disaster assistance

Special evaluation covers the period 5/83-12/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with project officials and beneficiaries. Given Bolivia's economic and political conditions, the project has been successful, despite inaccurate USAID/B preproject assumptions. To date, the National Rice Institute (ENA) has sold at least 90% of P.L. 480 Title II and Title III rice at subsidized, controlled prices in departmental capitals. However, the ENA has accorded priority to salaried workers and organizations in urban areas and has made no effort to reach rural victims, who have been hit hardest by the drought, because ENA assumed - falsely - that they were bereft of cash. This has led to growing resentment toward the ENA among campesinos. Further, ENA's poor administrative and bookkeeping procedures and likely petty corruption (noted in a recent A.I.D. audit) has led to considerable duplication in food sales and related inequities; e.g., up to 20% of the subsidized rice sold by ENA was resold at nearly a 400% markup, frequently to rural drought victims. National Community Development Services (NCDS), Food for the Hungry International (FHI), and CARITAS were to distribute free food to about 5,000 small communities under a Food for Work (FFW) program. NCDS and probably also FHI, however, lack the capacity to implement a project of this magnitude and distribution methods were not designed to reach those in remote locations, focusing instead on those near departmental capitals. Also, the FFW approach tended to impede the goal of distributing food, since many communities had already implemented emergency-related projects at their own initiative. Although the PVO's have made laudable efforts, all three need careful management, increased supervision, better population targeting, and budget reviews. A total of 47 recommendations focus on the need to: (1) expand the number of direct program administrators in La Paz and in the field; (2) create a data collection system to monitor program impact on intended beneficiaries; (3) establish a program to recapitalize drought-affected altiplano farmers; and (4) refocus distribution efforts to the most needy rural populations.