BOSCOSA : the forest conservation and management project -- Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica : project evaluation report

Evaluation focuses on activities from the 1992 evaluation (PD-ABF-158) through 3/1/94. BOSCOSA has reached a crisis point from which it has neither the funding nor the staff to recover. The crisis began at the end of 1992, when Cerro Brujo, the environmental association, split into two groups, and confrontation in the Rancho Quemado pilot area caused BOSCOSA to withdraw. These events disheartened BOSCOSA staff, some of whom left the program altogether, while others were transferred to new regional projects of the Neotropica Foundation, BOSCOSA's implementing agency. Throughout 1993, a large-scale turnover of staff, including long-time personnel, reduced BOSCOSA's ability to deal with these events and to meet the expectations it had raised in 1991-1992 by overambitiously expanding its operations from 4 to 8 communities. These problems, which were exacerbated by the uncertain level of A.I.D. funding, were capped by the failure of COOPEAGROMUEBLES, BOSCOSA's showcase project, at the end of 1993. As a result of this crisis, BOSCOSA is held in low esteem by the communities it serves, which associate it with failed activities (Rancho Quemado, COOPEAGROMUEBLES, failed pejibaye and guanabana initiatives), inability to generate significant incomes (some people have even lost money), inadequate delivery of reforestation and forest incentives, the unreliability of its technicians, and an influx of unfamiliar staff members as a result of turnover. It is recommended that BOSCOSA and Neotropica attempt to salvage the remains of the activities that are under the most public scrutiny; continued assistance would demonstrate that BOSCOSA is committed to its projects, and dispel the impression that it was "run out of town." Thus, BOSCOSA should continue activities with ASOPRAQ and COOPEAGROMUEBLES; secure markets for the pejibaye plantations in Rancho Quemado; help to resolve AGROMUEBLES' legal problems, and encourage any members who wish to reactivate activities or form a new group. BOSCOSA also needs to better communicate its strategies to beneficiary communities and to show more sensitivity to community interests; addition of a social scientist to the staff, which is composed almost exclusively of technicians, is advised. In the area of evaluation, BOSCOSA needs to assess the ecological and social impacts of its activities and not simply whether they achieve quantitative production goals. Indicators should be established for each project component and for the project as a whole, and information maintained for comparison over time. Special attention should be paid to failed activities, perhaps with the help of more objective external sources. Finally, given the reductions in staff and the level of available funding, BOSCOSA must prioritize its activities (rather than try to be "all things to all people") and secure funding based on those priorities. In cases where this entails abandoning efforts already begun, BOSCOSA should, in order to reduce expectations and avoid resentments, inform the communities in question of its new policy and make provisions for other organizations to provide similar services to those communities.