Complex humanitarian emergencies and USAID's humanitarian response

humanitarian assistance in nations afflicted by complex emergencies. It addresses three principal questions: Did U.S. emergency assistance save lives and alleviate suffering? Did it affect social tensions and political hostilities? Did it contribute to long-term economic development? The findings are based on field work in Haiti, Mozambique, and Rwanda and on evaluation results in other countries. The assessment concluded that emergency assistance programs funded by USAID and implemented by U.S. NGOs clearly helped save lives and alleviate suffering. Except for Haiti, however, data collection and monitoring were not done (or were done poorly), so it is difficult to quantify results. In fact, most evaluations of humanitarian assistance tell a "mission accomplished" story but are unable to substantiate that story with hard data. Distributing relief supplies was a problem to some extent in all three countries. Food aid, in particular, was highly valued and became a source of violent competition -- not only for its value as food but also as a source of political power for those controlling access. There were reports of corruption, theft, and political or personal favoritism in food aid distribution. And target populations did not always receive timely and sufficient food. NGOs addressed these problems with varying degrees of success. In Haiti they were highly successful in limiting diversion to 5-10%. In Mozambique, leakage was typically 30% when the government was in charge of distribution, and at one point reached 50%. But after the NGOs took over, losses fell to under 5%. In Rwanda, the military and former political leaders controlled much of the relief distribution and were able to divert substantial quantities of food (more than is usually the case in complex emergencies) from the intended beneficiaries for their own purposes. Since it is provided in the context of conflict, humanitarian assistance can result in unpredictable and substantial political effects. Though designed to relieve suffering and promote peace, humanitarian assistance can inadvertently fuel, sustain, or worsen complex emergencies by increasing the resources available to warring parties. In Haiti, massive quantities of emergency food aid reduced the probability of food riots during a period of political and economic stress and may have had a dampening effect on political tensions; but it also may have contributed to a political status quo that enabled the de facto military regime to stay in power longer. In Mozambique, external military assistance provided by the Soviet Union and South Africa fueled the civil war; food aid, by comparison, had relatively little effect on the country's political dynamics, although food diverted to soldiers may have contributed to the war effort. In Rwanda, genocidal killers were mixed with legitimate refugees in camps; targeting became problematic, and substantial quantities of food aid were diverted by Hutu extremists and militia resident in the camps. That had the unintended effect of prolonging the conflict. The notion that relief assistance can be made more development-oriented in the context of ongoing armed conflicts is problematic. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies provide no institutional framework to provide physical security and political stability -- both of which are preconditions for economic development. On the contrary, complex emergencies are often characterized by a total breakdown of state institutions and social and economic structures. Nonetheless, emergency assistance programs can help shape the pattern and direction of subsequent economic development. In all three countries, USAID and the NGOs not only provided immediate relief (food, medicine), but also agricultural inputs (seed, tools) and household goods to encourage refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their villages, resume food production, decrease their dependence on food aid, and maintain their livelihoods. They also implemented food-for-work and other programs that created short-term jobs and helped rehabilitate productive infrastructure (roads, irrigation) needed for economic development. The development objectives were clear: to restart subsistence agriculture and the rural economy. The assessment offers 4 management recommendations and 18 recommendations specific to the Kosovo crisis as of May 1999. (Author abstract, modified)