Providing emergency aid to Haiti

The assistance focused on: saving lives and alleviating suffering; political tensions associated with the complex emergency; and Haiti's long-term economic development. Conclusions are as follows: (1) In contrast to other countries, ethnic hostility or civil war was not the basis of Haiti's complex emergency. The economic embargo imposed by the international community in response to the 1991 coup d'etat created the urgent need for humanitarian assistance. (2) USAID and U.S. NGOs have the capacity to deliver sufficient, appropriately targeted emergency assistance to help ensure the survival of a country's vulnerable poor. As many as one in seven Haitians were receiving food aid during the 1991-96 period. In addition, USAID-funded NGOs were providing three fourths of the health care in the country. These actions helped control malnutrition, and although health conditions worsened, epidemics did not break out. In the absence of emergency assistance, more Haitians would have fled Haiti, risking boat passage to seek refuge in the United States or swelling the refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay. (3) Emergency assistance can help maintain social calm and mitigate political instability. The massive quantities of emergency assistance (especially food aid) provided by the international community helped offset the drop in incomes, increase in food prices, and the temporary closure of donor- funded development activities caused by the embargo. The food aid acted as a steam valve; it reduced the probability of food riots and arguably eased political tensions, especially in Port-au-Prince, where the poor who lost their jobs had few economic options. However, emergency assistance may have had the unintended negative effect of reducing pressure on the repressive military regime, thereby working against the purpose of the embargo. It also may have delayed the external military intervention that finally took place in October 1994. (4) Distribution of emergency food aid requires organization and control in order to prevent theft, guard against political manipulation, and protect beneficiaries. The large quantity of food aid provided Haiti became a source of violent competition -- both for its value for consumption and as a source of political power for those controlling access. Violent elements hijacked food supplies in some areas. Urban homes and community buildings used to stockpile food supplies were looted. Some local authorities such as mayors used food as political favors or for personal aggrandizement. Fighting among beneficiaries sometimes erupted when food was delivered in urban neighborhoods. The NGOs addressed these problems by stocking and distributing food aid in more neutral settings (schools, factory yards), using ration cards to track the receipt of food aid, and having police or agency personnel present to control beneficiaries. (5) Employment in Haiti dropped dramatically because of the embargo. In response, USAID initiated the Jobs Creation project both to create employment and to rehabilitate productive infrastructure (roads, irrigation). Some 500,000 person-months of short-term jobs were created during the project, and up to 20,000 people (including at least 20% women) were employed. The project was less successful in promoting long-term development, because the infrastructure often did not meet technical standards or was not adequately maintained. (6) Emergency provision of agricultural production inputs contributes to long-term economic development if it enables rural households to reduce farm decapitalization and dependency on food aid. Because some Haitian farmers had been forced to sell their agricultural assets in order to survive, some NGOs provided seeds and tools along with food commodities. This helped beneficiaries resume or maintain agricultural production and decrease their dependence on food relief. (7) The urgency of the moment relegated forward planning to the back burner. In particular, no efforts were made to train a core of technocratic managers (e.g., in public administration and economics) in anticipation of post-conflict governance needs. Although USAID funded more than 1,900 microprojects to support democratic processes and reinforce local governmental structures, Haiti's public sector and institutional infrastructure still lacked the capacity, even in 1998, to manage the country's development. Includes references. (Author abstract, modified)