EVALUATION OF THE RURAL ROADS PROJECT

This special evaluation prepared by USAID's chief engineer covers the period 12/1/79-12/31/80 and is attached to a PES facesheet and another special evaluation (PD-AAG-328-B1, F1). No methodology is given. The imminent restructuring of MWT will further delay project progress. If USAID and the host government disagree on new conditions for the project, USAID should consider ending one or more project components. Despite USAID urging and the readiness of design and contract documents, the construction of two feeder roads has not yet begun. Due to the low priority of this component for MWT, and the ability of project funds to finance construction of only 10 of 25 planned miles of road, USAID should deobligate the funds and not extend the time to meet conditions precedent. Construction of the highway laboratory is 5 months late. The laboratory may be hard to staff and, because a local university has a similar laboratory, it may not be needed. Due to MWT's inaction, USAID should consider ending funding for this activity. MWT has not decided how to improve the rebuilding, district, and central workshops. Given the construction materials shortage, completion of any improvements prior to the project's end is unlikely. Equipment repair has been continually delayed. USAID should disallow additional equipment purchases and fund improvements only if they can be finished in time. The performance of Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS), the contractor, has suffered due to the above problems, MWT's poor project management, and its own personnel changes and staffing problems. The project's likely redesign and reduced inputs will render at least one team position obsolete, requiring a contract renegotiation. Training conducted by TAMS has had no major long-term impact on local institutions, has used inadequate materials and facilities, and may not have been extended appropriately. Any redesign of the project should consider improving training program's effectiveness.