Final evaluation : farming systems research program no. 696-0110

The project was implemented in four communes in the Ruhengeri Prefecture: Nyamugali, Nyarutovu, Cyeru, and Butare. The final evaluation team found the project's training efforts, improvements to infrastructure, and work with women farmers were beneficial. However, the project suffered as a result of poor management, the implementation team's lack of expertise in FSR, and because recommendations from previous evaluations were not followed. Positive aspects of the project were the training program and AFRICARE's construction of infrastructure. A total of 22 Rwandans earned Ph.D., M.S., or B.S. degrees from U.S. universities, and more than half of these graduates were employed by Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda (ISAR). However, because of GOR policy constraints, their future in ISAR is uncertain. AFRICARE, for a modest sum of $750,000, repaired roads, installed potable water systems, built training centers, and constructed storage hangars in the project area. These improvements will be of continuing value to the rural community. The project had a significant impact upon women though women were not specifically targeted. The 1992 evaluation's rapid reconnaissance survey (RRS) revealed no difference between men and women's access to project personnel, resources, or information. Unfortunately, the project's failure to collect data on the number of women participants rendered impossible any disaggregation of project impacts comparatively between women and men. However, the project worked with women farmers, who composed an estimated 40% of all farmers; women were recruited as extension agents, and were represented among Rwandan counterparts for long-term training. One constraint to project success was that the FSR/Extension (FSR/E) team that was to implement the project had no experienced leadership, nor were they qualified to practice FSR. They conducted no complementary diagnostic or verification surveys to explore further findings of the project's preliminary survey and, thus, failed to characterize recommendation domains or identify and prioritize real constraints and problems of farmers. Since FSR methodology was not implemented practically none of the developed or proposed technologies were subjected to requisite socioeconomic analysis. Consequently, these technologies, such as the Lime + NPK treatment and the agroforestry species Sesbania were found to be unacceptable to farmers. Much on-station testing and even some on-farm trials conducted could be classified as upstream research; only a few on-farm trials fell under the category of downstream research or research oriented towards solving problems and constraints of farmers. A series of evaluations, internal and external, were performed, but most recommendations of the evaluating teams were not followed. The 1986 evaluation led to the fourth project amendment in which, unfortunately, USAID unilaterally eliminated the extension component and the extension advisor's position, compromising the project's relevance to FSR/E. In 1988, the inspector general found the changes in the fourth amendment unacceptable and recommended an evaluation to determine the significance of extension for continued project implementation. The 1989 project evaluation that followed led to a fifth amendment, in which the extension component was reinstated. Project management by the University of Arkansas (UOA), USAID,and ISAR was unsatisfactory throughout the project. With a few exceptions, the UOA was not able to provide a TA team that was adequately trained and experienced in FSR/E or with multidisciplinary capabilities, nor were the TA teams representative of required disciplines, including agricultural economics. The team was unable to integrate itself fully with ISAR. Administrative and financial management problems plagued the UOA. USAID management was poor throughout the project. Some salient management errors were use of project funds for USAID management costs that were not budgeted and for revision of the 1986 mid-term evaluation, with subsequent elimination of the extension component. Effective implementation of the project was rendered extremely difficult by the advent of armed hostilities in October 1990, which led to the evacuation of the expatriate staff from the Rwerere Experiment Station in November 1990. Subsequently, the expatriate staff made monthly or bimonthly visits to the stations from Kigali, which led to a commensurate reduction in levels of effort by research station staff. The station was directly attacked in June 1992 and activity at the station had ceased at the time of this final evaluation. ISAR was unable to provide counterparts to the expatriate team. Those counterparts who were assigned were continually replaced, resulting in a lack of continuity and commitment to sustained research. Because of the absence of an experienced FSR economist, the socioeconomic program was seriously compromised. The sociologist who was appointed as a socioeconomist was unable to fulfill the task of adequate economic analysis or even partial budgeting. This problem was likely the reason that the economic analysis contained in the final project report was prepared without his knowledge and/or participation. Because technologies tested among farmers did not undergo rigorous scrutiny, their sustainability was not fully assured. Although the higher yielding varieties of beans, wheat, and potatoes continued to be used by farmers, the value of the much preferred bean variety G2333 was compromised by the onset of a fungal root disease. Other technologies, such as the Lime + NPK treatment and the agroforestry species Sesbania were either abandoned or recognized as inappropriate. (Author abstract)