Iraq Local Governance Program – Phase III (LGP III) Quarterly Report, July–September 2009

The provincial governments with which LGP III works have now had an opportunity to test the central assumption of the PPA: that the authority to arrive at and implement decisions of consequence to Iraq's citizens would gradually be devolved to those closest to the citizens themselves. Predictably, these elected local representatives have had to navigate the gap between an entrenched central government bureaucracy, developed over decades of dictatorial rule, and the letter of the law contained in the PPA. The PPA itself is inconclusive and, on many critical issues, downright perplexing. Helping answer these questions has been a large part of LGP III's purpose this quarter, as the political calendar, with its planning and budgeting deadlines and fast-approaching national elections, has brought issues of effective governance to the fore. At its most blunt, the central government's authority has resulted in the detention of several PC members whose political affiliations were allegedly their only "crime." More subtly, however, the central government ministries have flexed their muscles by restricting both the time and scope of planning and budgeting for the upcoming year, limiting what LGP III had originally conceived of as a six-month process to six weeks of form-filling, informed by little more than the instincts of a province's governor and the scarce and often unreliable data at his staff's disposal. Despite these challenges, the budgeting process this quarter reaffirmed two fundamental truths about LGP III: 1) that Iraqi advisors continue to be a reliable, trusted resource for governors and PC members, and 2) that the insight these advisors have gained into the inadequacies of the law and the complexities of its implementation represents a body of expertise that is proving vital in shaping the dynamics of government and power in the new Iraq. With this expertise comes a responsibility to engage in critical, facts-based inquiry, something the LGP III Policy Team has put front-and-center in the third quarter. From analyzing how various PPA articles complement or in some cases contradict the body of relevant Iraqi law to flagging potential disagreements over authority inherent in the law, the set of Policy Briefs contained in Annex A consolidates the intellectual capital earned by LGP III's advisors since the initiation of the program. Much of this intellectual capital has been an outgrowth of LGP III's assistance with the planning and budgeting process, the development of models for delivering and monitoring services, as well as upgrading the skills of those charged with overseeing these services. A more important driver, perhaps, has been the quest for clarity from provincial officials themselves, who, despite the limited jurisdiction afforded them in practice, have repeatedly insisted on testing the limits of the PPA and, in turn, asserting the authorities—from monitoring to budget formulation—that they believe should rightly reside with them. LGP III's approach has been to acknowledge that the law is inadequate and to support its customers in challenging its ambiguities to the extent that they are willing and on key issues that fall within the program's Work Elements. As such, LGP III has advised on a range of heretofore unexplored issues—from the legality of levying local taxes, to the mechanisms for disciplining province-based ministerial officials, to the need for developing an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget that is informed by the provinces' capital investment priorities. These efforts point to an emerging trend in Iraq: It is that the modalities of governance and, indeed, the fate of the governed are being defined at least as much by a new vanguard of dedicated provincial leaders as by the top-down diktats of the central government. Below, the most salient examples of this trend in the provinces where LGP III works are presented. In Babil, LGP III has been working to emphasize education and oversight, with a focus on developing a more equitable distribution of resources. In Baghdad, LGP III has been pushing performance measures and advocating for a more equitable distribution of resources. In Basrah, LGP III has been attempting to generate local revenue, while in Ninawa, LGP III has been asserting the PC's monitoring role. These efforts are part of a broader strategy to support the development of sustainable national institutions and to promote effective governance in Iraq. By working with provincial officials and providing them with the expertise and resources they need, LGP III is helping to build a more inclusive and participatory system of governance that is responsive to the needs of Iraq's citizens.